Economics 313: Money and Banking
Section 101
Fall Semester, 2007
Towson University

Description / Online logistics / Grading
Requirements / Academic integrity / Course outline

Late or missed assignments:  Quizzes must be taken on their assigned dates; no make-up quizzes will be given; I will drop the two lowest grades.  Late papers will be penalized 5% per 24-hour period (including weekend days), beginning at class time the day they are due.  Please submit late papers to my faculty mailbox or the slot on my office door; write both the due date and the date and time when you drop it off on the back of the paper by your name.

The final exam must be taken on its scheduled date unless you arrange some other time with me, well before the exam date.  If some emergency prevents you from taking a quiz or the exam on schedule, you must present a written explanation of the problem before the quiz or exam, or as soon as possible afterwards, so that we can make alternative arrangements.

Academic Integrity: This should go without saying, but let us say it anyway:  Be honest. Present as your own work only your own work. Your character development is far more important than your grade.  Practice integrity in your actions and you will build it in yourself.

I encourage you to work together. All of us learn a lot from talking over ideas with others. So feel free to work on problems together and to have classmates read your written work and make comments on it. BUT any work you submit must be your own. This requirement applies notably to reading response papers and any take-home quizzes: feel free to talk the questions over with others all you want, but let the answers you submit be your own. Others' contributions to your thinking should be identified as such in your papers.

I will deal severely with any sloppiness in this respect. Anyone who cheats will fail the course.
Narrative Outline and Schedule of Readings

The readings for each week are given in the table below.  Readings from the main textbooks by Selgin and White are indicated by "S" for Selgin and "W" for White.  In addition to the readings listed below, additional handouts and web readings may be assigned from time to time. See the Blackboard site for announcements about these.  You will see that many portions of the narration that follows are quoted from Dr. Steven Horwitz's syllabus, and most of the readings are taken from or based on that syllabus also.

Introduction

As we meet but once a week, and you will have had no time to read before our first class meeting, we will devote the first class to a general orientation to the concepts we will encounter in the course.  This will involve a lot of sorting out of concepts and drawing terminological distinctions.
       
Aug. 29

"I, Pencil"
Friedman
S 1 “Overview”

       

I. Free Banking and Monetary Equilibrium

In Prof. Horwitz's words:

"We will begin with money’s role as a social institution and see how it facilitates broader market relationships and social coordination.  The cornerstone of this section, and in many ways the course, is Carl Menger’s theory of the origin of money.  Menger argues that money arose as an unintended consequence of barter exchange, rather than as the conscious product of human design.  The use of money in exchange has enabled us to form money prices and dramatically increase the productivity and complexity of the economy.  Money prices play an important role in economic coordination, and Hayek’s paper explicates this role more fully."

Then we go on to the continuing evolution of money and of banking institutions, combining actual history with Selgin and White's conjectural history of what would evolve in a regime of real banking freedom.  This is to me the most provocative and interesting part of the course.  Suppose governments had left money and banking alone, except to do government's essential job of protecting property and enforcing contracts: What money and banking institutions would have spontaneously evolved? 

This section raises the all-important question of how much money would be issued by banks in a mature free banking system and the closely-related question of how much money should be issued at any particular time.  That is, what should the money supply be?  This is the number one question for all central banks; it is what monetary policy is about.  Should the money supply be kept stable, or should it grow?  If it grows, how fast should it grow?  2-3% per year?  At the same rate as real economic growth?  The question is immensely important.  It affects interest rates, and therefore investment, and therefore economic growth

Be clear at the outset that there is serious disagreement among outstanding economists on this issue of what the money supply should be and how fast it should grow.

The free banking advocates we study paint a very positive (rosy?) picture of the money supply in a free banking system.  They hold that the money supply would be regulated well--even "correctly"--by the market discipline of competition among free banks, many of whom would issue their own notes just as they now issue their own checking deposits.  Market forces would induce banks, in their own self-interest, to supply a quantity of money equal to the quantity of money demanded (at going prices).  That is, free banking would tend to maintain monetary equilibrium, a notion whose merits we examine in some detail.

At the end of this section of the course we introduce Prof. Roger Garrison's capital-based macroeconomic model to help clarify the connections between the money supply, investment, and economic growth.

       
Sep. 5 The evolution of money, and of banking institutions, subject to market forces alone
   

Menger “On the Origin of Money”
Hayek
“The Use of Knowledge in Society” available online at
     
http://www.econlib.org/library/Essays/hykKnw1.html
S 2 “The Evolution of a Free Banking System”

W 1 “The Evolution of Market Monetary Institutions”

Sep. 12 Free banks are able to create (inside) money that they can loan at interest, but how much money will they lend, and might they create too much?
   

W 3 “Money Issue by Unrestricted Banks”
S 3 “Credit Expansion with Constant Money Demand”

Sep. 19 From the macroeconomic perspective of social coordination, how much money should banks lend, and at what interest rate?  The case for monetary equilibrium.
   

S 4 “Monetary Equilibrium”
S 5 "Changes in the Demand for Inside Money"
Horwitz 2000 “Monetary equilibrium as analytical framework,” pp. 65-75, 81-2, 96-103
Roger Garrison’s PowerPoint show, “Hayekian Means-Ends Analysis,”
through slide 35 (http://www.auburn.edu/~garriro/macro.htm)

   

II. American Banking History to 1913

Here we emphasize some of the ways in which state and federal governments in the U.S. have interfered with the freedom of banks and their customers to do business by mutual agreement.  The main purpose of this section of the course is for students to understand that there has never been free-market banking in the United States.  We look at how governments in the U.S. have prevented, for better or worse, free banking from existing.  We study up through the creation of the Federal Reserve System in 1913, in the process seeing some of the historical origins of that central bank.

In Prof. Horwitz's words,

"We will highlight the conflict between the natural forces of order and the chaotic effects of regulatory intervention.  These historical and institutional questions are crucial to understanding how past and present banking systems have worked and failed. One of themes we will explore is the degree to which market forces or government are responsible for the problems that have plagued the US banking system throughout history, with an eye toward understanding the plusses and minuses of the Fed."

Sep. 26  

S 1 (again) pp. 12-15 “The U.S. Experience”
Horwitz 1992 “Regulatory Chaos and Spontaneous Order Under the National Banking System

   

III. Central Banking Theory and Practice

Here we focus on central banking.  We look first at the some of the main justifications that have been given for central banking (that most economists agree with, implicitly at least).  Among these is the belief that central banks are necessary to prevent bank failures and crises.  Next we look at monetary policy: how modern central banks control the money supply.  This is the section of the course most pertinent to the way the world works today (and most similar to what other money and banking students are learning in more conventional courses).  In Prof. Horwitz's words,

We will undertake a careful analysis of the Fed’s tools, such as reserve requirements, the discount rate, and open market operations, and how they affect its various targets.  These targets include various measures of reserves, which in turn change the money supply and interest rates.  We will discuss the flaws in this process and what they imply for the Fed’s ability to create and maintain monetary order.  We will conclude by exploring what really motivates central banks in the political environment in which they operate, including the search for seignorage and political business cycles."

Oct. 3 Why have a central bank?
   

W 4 “The Evolution and Rationales of Central Banking”
W 5 “Should Government Play a Role in Money?”
W 6 “Should Government Play a Role in Banking?”

Oct. 10 Multiple deposit creation, the money supply, and monetary policy under central banking
   

Mishkin 15 “Multiple Deposit Creation and the Money Supply Process”
Mishkin 16 “Determinants of the Money Supply”
Mishkin 17 “Tools of Monetary Policy”
Mishkin 18 “Conduct of Monetary Policy: Goals and Targets”

Oct. 17 The political economy of central banking
   

Cagan “Monetarism”
W 7 “Seignorage”
W 8 “Central Bank as Bureaucracy”
W 9 “Political Business Cycle Hypotheses”

 

IV. American Banking History continued: Deflation and The Great Depression

The historical record of central banking has been poor.  Less than two decades after the Fed took control of the money supply in the United States, the country went into the Great Depression.  Persuasive scholarship puts much of the blame for the Great Depression on the Fed, which did not (and arguably could not, even if it had wanted to) maintain monetary equilibrium.  After a significant increase in the money supply during the 1920s, the Fed allowed a catastrophic decrease in the money supply in the 1930s.  This decrease in the money supply resulted in a wrenching deflation.

In Prof. Horwitz's words,

"We can see the importance of a banking system’s ability to maintain monetary equilibrium by seeing what happens during monetary disequilibria...  Deflation is [one] form of monetary disequilibrium and we will explore it both theoretically and through illustrations taken from the Great Depression of the 1930s. Our discussion will show deflation’s destructive potential, despite its rarity in real world economies.  We will emphasize the interplay between poor monetary policy and wage and price rigidities that can, and did during the Great Depression, turn the minor effects of excess demands for money into major economic catastrophes."

Oct. 24  

Greenfield 1 “Depression”
Greenfield 2 “Banks”

 
Oct. 31   Greenfield 3 “The Treasury”
Vedder and Galloway, “From New Era to New Deal”
   

 

V. Inflation

The other, far more common form of monetary disequilibrium is inflation.  Most central banks through history have inflated their currencies most of the time, by continually supplying more money (than is demanded at going prices).  In Prof. Horwitz's words,

"Here we will discuss the various economic and political aspects of inflation.  Our focus will be on the costs inflation imposes on economic systems and how that retards economic growth and socio-political stability.  We will also take a brief look at how inflation might trigger business cycles and its relationship to fiscal policy by discussing budget deficits and monetization of the debt."

       
Nov. 7  

Hazlitt, “The Mirage of Inflation”
Horwitz 2000, ch. 4 “Inflation, the Market Process, and Social Order”

       

VI. Monetary Policy, Monetary Rules, Monetary Regimes

In Prof. Horwitz's words,

"What is the Fed up to now?  Here we will briefly try to answer this question by discussing ... the current state of [both] theory and practice in monetary policy.  Our focus will be on the debate over the possibility and desirability of targeting either some measure of prices or some interest rate.  Perhaps as no surprise, we will see that neither target is completely desirable and neither is likely to work, either economically or politically.  We will also examine the rules versus discretion debate and lead into our discussion of free banking by exploring its advantages compared to both rules and discretion.  Our discussion of deflation and inflation emphasized the importance of a monetary regime’s ability to minimize deviations from monetary equilibrium.  We can reflect on that point through a comparison of central and free banking.  The point here is not to convince you of the correctness of either side, but rather to indicate the important issues and to show which of them are at the core of current debates among monetary theorists.

Nov. 14 Can the problematic incentives of central banks be overcome?
   

W 10 “Discretion and Dynamic Inconsistency”
W 11 “Monetary Rules”
Timberlake “Federal Reserve Policy Since 1945”

Nov. 21

*** NO CLASS MEETING.  HAPPY THANKSGIVING ***

Nov. 28 Would the alternative monetary regime of free banking produce better results?
   

S 7 “The Dilemma of Central Banking”
S 8 “The Supply of Currency”
S 9 “Stability and Efficiency”
S 10 “Miscellaneous Criticisms of Free Banking”

   
Dec. 5 Wrap-up and review
       
Dec. 12 Final exam, two hours, usual time.  Please verify this date and time against the university calendar in case I have made a mistake.

Final Exam - Tuesday, Dec. 13, 12:30 p.m. - 2:30 p.m.  Please double-check this against the university calendar to make sure that I have read it correctly.