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Statement of Purpose

Note from the Editor

First of all, I would like to thank the editors for all they have done to help produce what you are reading right now. Without them and the faculty behind the production, Allaire Stallsmith, Emily Daugherty, and Robert Rook, the Journal would not even exist. Everyone did an outstanding job deliberating, cooperating, and working efficiently to make this all work out.

Also, it is my pleasure to thank everyone that submitted their papers to the Journal this year. Taking the time to submit everything properly and work with the editors to produce a polished and finished work can be difficult, but I am glad that they all stuck it out, and I am happy to see their hard work paying off.

I would also like to thank the faculty who took the time to recommend the papers for the students, as well as the faculty who reviewed the papers after they were submitted.

Finally, I cannot forget to thank Towson University's Design Center and Printing Services. The Journal would be just an idea if they were not there to put it on paper for us.

Thank you all again. You really cannot make a Journal by yourself, and I owe a lot to these people for helping to make the *Journal of Historical Studies* something real.

I hope to have this all happen again next year, so Towson, be ready to submit your papers.

Happy writing and enjoy your History!

Patrick Cutter
Editor, *Journal of Historical Studies*

Time of Transition: From Battleships to Airpower

By: William Wauschek

General William Mitchell once said, “In the development of air power, one has to look ahead and not backward and figure out what is going to happen, not too much what has happened.”¹ His comment proved true as the airplane’s development rivaled the battleship’s traditional roles in the 1920’s and 1930’s. Despite critics and experiments showing the battleship’s vulnerability to aerial attacks, the military repudiated the evidence. Japan’s aerial attack on Pearl Harbor that crippled the Pacific Fleet changed this mindset, forcing the American military to rely on aircraft. In the decisive battles in the Pacific Theater, airplanes, not the battleship, led the offensives, helping America gain footholds and establish naval superiority in the Pacific. With the destruction of the *Yamato* by aircraft and the end of World War II, the aircraft dethroned the battleship, changing the mannerisms of war indefinitely.

Limitations and Early Doubts

After World War I, the United States enjoyed an economic boom that took the name “The Roaring Twenties.” Wealthy and no longer threatened, America returned to isolationist policies and downsized their military. However, America’s relations with its allies tested these policies as a new naval arms race began. Naval powers produced battleships, the essence of navies at this time, in large numbers, taxing resources and peace. Wary of another war, America started the Washington Naval Conference of 1921 with the four other major powers, Britain, Japan, Italy, and France, focusing on limiting the production of battleships and other naval vessels. The United States and Britain could not harbor battle fleets over 525,000 tons, with Japan limited at 325,000 tons, and

Italy and France at 175,000 tons. Additionally, the countries scrapped battleship projects that exceeded 35,000 tons. All powers also agreed to restrict their battleship's guns to sixteen inches. Many accepted these requirements, ending the naval race briefly.² While aircraft carriers also received limitations, the treaty's leniency encouraged the powers to convert the battleship hulls to carriers.³ Although the carrier's importance remained ambiguous, it guaranteed a future for aircraft.

Along with increasing concern in cutting back expenditures and maintaining peace, debates over the battleship's effectiveness began. General Billy Mitchell, a World War I veteran and an advocate of airpower, led this debate. While promoting for an independent air force and other reforms, he prophesized the obsolescence of the battleship due to the airplane's growing strategic role in the military.⁴ His aggressiveness led to a tense relationship with the Department of the Navy and the commencement of bombing experiments to settle the dispute. In November of 1920, airplanes bombed and sunk the outdated battleship *U.S.S. Indiana* near the coast of Virginia, giving Mitchell credibility.⁵ In June of 1921, Mitchell presented aerial operations against naval vessels, leading to the sinking of several more ships. Although the planes failed to sink the moving *U.S.S. Iowa*, few doubted the possibility of it sinking if immobile.⁶ After several more experiments, the Navy started a final test later that year with the modern German *Ostfriesland*. From multiple altitudes, Mitchell and his squadrons dropped a variety of fake and live bombs, sinking the ship before reporters and proving the general's claims correct.⁷

Despite the success, Mitchell's poor relationship with his superiors led to his downfall. In 1925, the Army demoted Mitchell to the rank of colonel and reassigned him

to San Antonio, Texas, ostracizing him from the United States Army Air Service in Washington.⁸ Mitchell's continuing criticisms resulted in a court-martial for insubordination later that year.⁹ Career ruined, Mitchell resigned.¹⁰ Despite the American military curtailing airpower, Mitchell and others continued to speak of the airplane's future, predicting America's involvement in World War II.¹¹ Unfortunately, Mitchell died in 1936, not living to see his predictions confirmed.

Taranto and Pearl Harbor

World War II presented the maturation of technologies started in the previous Great War, from weapons to tactics. Unlike the United States, the Allies and the Axis assigned airplanes for protecting troop movements and disrupting military production. Ironically, planes also attacked naval vessels, including the battleship. On November 1940, the British bombed and torpedoed a large portion of the Italian navy harbored at Taranto. With twenty-one old, carrier-borne Swordfishes, the British destroyed one battleship and damaged two others with minimal losses, forcing Italy to move its ships to Naples, aiding the British effort in the Mediterranean.¹² Admiral Andrew Cunningham, responsible for the operation, boasted, "Taranto... should be remembered for ever as having shown once and for all that in the Fleet Air Arm the Navy has its most devastating weapon."¹³ While America took little heed of the aircrafts' effectiveness, the Japanese used Britain's plan to eliminate the United States' Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor that threatened Japan's Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.¹⁴

Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, in charge of attacking Pearl Harbor,¹⁵ compared Taranto to his objective. Like the British, he planned to surprise the forces in the harbor.¹⁶ Instead of one carrier like the British, he committed six to the operation. Along

with an assortment of vessels, two battleships followed, both intended for defensive purposes.¹⁷ To overcome the forty-foot waters at Pearl Harbor, the Japanese used similar British modifications from the Taranto operation on their torpedoes to reach the targets.¹⁸ Prepared, Yamamoto's force attacked on December 7, 1941. Through several American intelligence failures, Japan achieved complete surprise.¹⁹ Losses included five battleships, with three more damaged, dozens of planes and resources, and 3,500 men,²⁰ while Japan lost 185 pilots.²¹ Now controlling the Pacific, Japan captured America's Pacific territories, exacerbating the situation. Humbled and weakened by aircraft, America joined an uncertain war.

Dueling Planes

With three aircraft carriers spared from the attack on Pearl Harbor,²² America relied on aircraft to counter the Japanese offensive, proving their effectiveness early during the Pacific Theater. In May 1942, Admiral Nimitz, commander of the Pacific Fleet, sent Task Force 17 under Admiral Fletcher's command against Japanese forces in the Coral Sea to defend Port Moresby in Papua New Guinea.²³ Using the carriers *Lexington* and *Yorktown*, and a small set of vessels,²⁴ America faced the Japanese Fifth Carrier Division's carriers *Zuikaku*, *Shokaku*, and *Shoho*. Neither side held battleships, nor needed them, as both failed to come into range. Instead, they used aircraft to locate and attack the other, making it the first carrier against carrier battle in history.²⁵ In three days, America lost the *Lexington*, approximately 543 men and 66 aircraft, while sinking Japan's *Shoho*, destroying 101 planes, and killing approximately two to five thousand personnel.²⁶ Halting Japan's invasion and inflicting irrecoverable losses, the battle became America's first victory in the war.²⁷

Coerced by Doolittle's bombing of Tokyo in April, Japan attempted to capture Midway for security and to destroy the American carriers.²⁸ Trying to divert America's focus from Midway, Yamamoto sent forces to the Aleutian Islands. He also prepared four large carriers and two light carriers for the invasion of Midway.²⁹ Seven battleships intended to destroy the carriers³⁰ followed, which was a fatal flaw.³¹ Due to American intelligence, Yamamoto's ploy failed,³² allowing Nimitz to send Task Force 16 and 17³³ with the *Enterprise*, *Hornet*, and the repaired *Yorktown*, again with no battleship support.³⁴

On June 4, Japan attacked, damaging the base and repelling island and carrier-borne aircraft. Japan's simultaneous operations confused their crews, leaving explosives and fuel strewn upon the decks, helping the Americans destroy three of the large carriers.³⁵ Yamamoto's remaining carrier, *Hiryū*, damaged the *Yorktown* before being sunk by a counterattack. Although losing 340 men, 147 planes, and the *Yorktown* later, America's victory proved decisive.³⁶ Japan lost four carriers, 150 planes, and approximately 3,400 men, limiting their amount of experienced pilots further.³⁷ Outranged, the Japanese battleships failed to attack the carriers and feared another aerial attack during their retreat.³⁸ America's aircrafts achieved the victory, presenting the turning point of the war.

Aircraft on the Attack

The first American offensive targeted the Solomon Islands in August 1942. Upon landing under aerial and naval support, the Marines captured the airfields. Early on, a Japanese naval engagement at night caused Admiral Fletcher to pull the American carriers out, fearing further losses. The lack of air protection caused the rest of the

invasion fleet to retreat,³⁹ delaying major supplies until November.⁴⁰ In September, Japan targeted Guadalcanal's Henderson Airfield. With the Cactus Air Force⁴¹ and naval support, the Marines persevered,⁴² deciding the fate of Guadalcanal.⁴³

In naval engagements, from Santa Cruz to the second battle of Guadalcanal, the airplane caused or assisted in the destruction of airplanes, transports, and battleships heading for Henderson Airfield.⁴⁴ While battleships played a role, they usually became untraditional anti-aircraft platforms.⁴⁵ They only played a major part in the Second Battle of Guadalcanal, becoming the Pacific's first engagement between battleships.⁴⁶ By November, Japan saw defeat,⁴⁷ withdrawing in February 1943.⁴⁸

Despite losing two carriers, several other vessels and aircraft, and thousands of men, America's industries and manpower offset them. Japan lacked these capabilities, exacerbating their losses.⁴⁹ Yamamoto's death in April 1943 after an aerial ambush⁵⁰ confirmed his premonition of the waking "sleeping giant"⁵¹ and deepened Japan's crisis. Perfecting the techniques used in Guadalcanal, the Americans regained the Solomon Islands and other lost territories throughout 1943. Aerial operations damaged or destroyed bases near these campaigns, confirming the importance of air supremacy. America's industries supported this progress, constructing several carriers and planes, outnumbering Japan's shrinking fleet.

On June 15, 1944, Marines invaded Saipan.⁵² In response, Admiral Ozawa's First Mobile Fleet⁵³ attacked Admiral Raymond Spruance's Fifth Fleet at the Philippine Sea,⁵⁴ specifically Vice Admiral Marc Mitscher's Task Force 58's fifteen carriers.⁵⁵ Despite harboring nine carriers, Ozawa lacked experienced pilots and land-based aircraft⁵⁶ due to previous engagements.⁵⁷ Japan lost 402 planes⁵⁸ with most of the 123 American losses

resulting from emergency landings, not the battle.⁵⁹ For two days, American aircraft counterattacked, sinking three Japanese carriers. “The Marianas Turkey Shoot”⁶⁰ resulted in little damage against Task Force 58, the worst to *South Dakota*⁶¹ as the battleship line supported ground forces.⁶² The capture of Saipan in July⁶³ expanded aerial operations, commencing B-29 raids against Japanese cities, taxing the enemy’s shrinking resources.⁶⁴

America’s invasion of Leyte in the Philippine Islands by the Seventh Fleet on October 20, 1944 gave Japan’s crippled navy a final opportunity to debilitate the American navy.⁶⁵ Attempting to use their carriers as bait, the Japanese amassed the remnants of their navy, organized into Northern, Southern, Center, and two diversionary forces,⁶⁶ to attack Admiral William Halsey Jr.’s Third Fleet.⁶⁷ Halsey commanded the four divisions of Task Force 38’s eighteen carriers, six battleships and several smaller vessels.⁶⁸ On October 23, the force’s planes found the Center Force at Sibuyan Sea, consisting of five battleships and no carriers,⁶⁹ starting the first of four engagements at the battle of Leyte Gulf.⁷⁰ Despite losing a light carrier earlier to Japanese aircraft,⁷¹ Halsey’s forces destroyed several ships, including the super-battleship *Musashi* while losing 18 planes.⁷² The attacks prevented the Center Force from rendezvousing with the Southern Force, hindering Japan’s battle at Surigao Strait.⁷³

Spotting the force in advance through aerial reconnaissance, Halsey sent Rear Admiral Jesse Oldendorf with several battleships that survived the attack on Pearl Harbor⁷⁴ and other vessels without air support. In the battle, America destroyed two battleships and almost the entire Southern Force.⁷⁵ This victory proved bittersweet, as this became the final battleship engagement in history, marking the weapon’s final days

in major military operations.⁷⁶ During Oldendorf's encounter, another part of Halsey's fleet engaged the diversionary carrier force at Samar, giving the Center Force a chance to attack with their heavily armored ships. With little protection, the American carrier force faced the potential of defeat.⁷⁷ Through the efforts of the destroyer escorts and aircraft, the Center Force retreated.⁷⁸ Sacrificing his chance to sink more of the Center Force, Halsey sent carriers to Cape Engano for the final battle of Leyte Gulf.⁷⁹

Japan's Northern Force's, which consisted of three carriers, two carrier battleships, 110 aircraft,⁸⁰ and a small assortment of vessels,⁸¹ faced a powerful force of American planes and ships. Through October 25 and 26, six waves of American aircraft⁸² and minor vessels attacked, destroying four carriers and several other ships.⁸³ Americans suffered few losses, with an unknown amount of planes lost,⁸⁴ ending the largest naval battle in history in their favor.⁸⁵ Japan's total losses included four carriers and three battleships amongst the twenty-six sunk and ten thousand men, with America losing three carriers, three other ships, an unknown amount of planes,⁸⁶ and 1,500 men.⁸⁷ Despite controversy over Halsey's decisions,⁸⁸ the battle of Leyte Gulf finalized the fate of the Pacific Theater. Questions of Japan's surrender arose,⁸⁹ despite Japan's introduction of *kamikaze*, or "divine wind,"⁹⁰ that promised a long fight ahead.⁹¹ The battle also showed the development and effectiveness of aircraft, guaranteeing its future.

Yamato and Vindication

Recapturing the Philippines, America and the Allies continued the offensive. Aircraft again provided air support for the troops, destroying ground targets, aircraft, and ships attempting to halt the invasion. Through 1944 and 1945, American B-29s and other aircraft continued to bombard Japan, crippling industries and cities. The infamous Tokyo

Fire Raid on May 9th and 10th of 1945 proved especially devastating, destroying over fifteen square miles of Tokyo, bringing Japan's war closer to home.⁹²

These pressures increased after America's invasion of Iwo Jima on February 19, 1945 and its capture on March 16, 1945.⁹³ The capture of these airfields brought American aircraft closer to Japan, enabling escort fighter planes to protect the bombers. A great deal of planes crash-landed onto the island as well, saving dozens of planes and hundreds of lives.⁹⁴ For the Japanese, the loss of one of their home islands provided further evidence of Japan losing the war against the Allies. As America invaded Okinawa on April 1, both militaries knew nothing else stood between Japan and the Allies.⁹⁵ As American forces fought the Japanese army, Japan launched Operation Kikusui, the beginning of the *kamikaze* strikes against the invasion force of Task Force 58.⁹⁶ Japan's navy also commenced Operation Ten'ichigo on April 6: *Yamato* and her nine escorts.⁹⁷

Its secret construction starting in 1937,⁹⁸ Japan's national symbol, the *Yamato*, emerged as a new breed of battleship.⁹⁹ With a new structural design, 22,895 tons of armor, and 18.1 inch guns, she and her sister, *Musashi*, became the largest battleships ever constructed.¹⁰⁰ Despite these expensive innovations and her commission in 1941, *Yamato* played a limited role in the war.¹⁰¹ She did not participate in the Pearl Harbor operation due to her inadequate speed. Though the flagship, during Midway, she and her fellow battleships failed to engage the carriers.¹⁰² She earned the nickname "Hotel Yamato" due to her absence in the naval battles around the Solomon Islands, aggravating many military leaders.¹⁰³ After sailing to several ports for several months, she entered the battle of Philippine Sea, as anti-aircraft fire support.¹⁰⁴ Her fortunes changed slightly

during the battle of Leyte Gulf. Part of the Central Force, she took slight damage while witnessing the sinking of her counterpart during the battle of Sibuyan Sea.¹⁰⁵ Returning to the fight at the battle of Samar, *Yamato* fired several rounds before retreating with the remnants of the force. Afterwards, she returned to Japan to avoid American air raids.¹⁰⁶ Japan's super-battleship seemed to be of little use.

Leaving port on April 6, 1945 for Okinawa to destroy the invasion fleet and assist the Japanese army,¹⁰⁷ *Yamato* and the escort's crew knew of their suicide mission.¹⁰⁸ Failing to learn from their mistake at Leyte Gulf, the group lacked air support, determining their fate.¹⁰⁹ Thanks to American aviation and submarine reconnaissance, the Allied forces prepared for the attack. Although Admiral Spruance assembled a force of battleships and escort vessels, Vice Admiral Mitscher used carriers instead.¹¹⁰ On April 7, 386 American aircraft attacked the group,¹¹¹ the lacking anti-aircraft fire from the *Yamato*¹¹² enabling them to destroy five of the escorts.¹¹³ Within two hours,¹¹⁴ five bombs and ten torpedoes from five waves of aircraft sank the *Yamato*. Japan's failure cost them 3,665 men while the United States lost ten planes and twelve men.¹¹⁵ *Yamato's* destruction confirmed that airplanes now determined wars, not battleships.

Into The Wild Blue Yonder

Despite the loss of *Yamato*, the Japanese continued fighting on Okinawa until America gained full control on June 22, 1945.¹¹⁶ While 12,513 Americans died and tens of thousands more wounded during the fight,¹¹⁷ Japan lost 110,071 men.¹¹⁸ Japan's fanatical resistance concerned the new President Harry Truman and his military leaders, as the invasion of the Japanese mainland would cost countless lives. In May, the final preparations of a secret project gave the administration an alternative.¹¹⁹ On August 6,

1945, the B-29 *Enola Gay* dropped the atomic bomb *Little Boy* onto Hiroshima,¹²⁰ killing 66,000 people.¹²¹ Japan's refusal to surrender prompted America to send the B-29 *Bockscar* on August 9 to drop the second atomic bomb, *Fat Man*, onto Nagasaki, killing 40,000.¹²² On August 14, Japan yielded. The surrender ceremony commenced on September 2, on the battleship *Missouri*, officially ending the war. The airplane, which brought America into World War II, now ended it.

After more than two decades of debate, the airplane proved itself worthy of overtaking the battleship. While General Mitchell's controversial experiments in the 1920's proved this, the military operations at Taranto and Pearl Harbor vindicated Mitchell and other aircraft supporters' arguments. Lacking seaworthy battleships, the American military relied on aircraft in their operations against the Japanese army and navy. From the carrier engagement of Coral Sea to the air raids on Japan, the airplane decided America's victories in the Pacific Theater. By 1944, the airplane's impact made battleship-minded naval leaders approach operations as a "carrier war."¹²³ The production numbers also showed the shift. From 1941 to 1945, America produced 297,199 aircraft in total. From 1935 to 1945, America created two large, twenty-seven regular, and 107 escort carriers, while producing only eight battleships.¹²⁴ Although it can be argued that battleships take years to build, the overwhelming number of carriers built signifies the airplane's impact on the American navy. During most operations, battleships provided support for troops and carriers, both responsibilities that the aircraft also did effectively.

As the battleship's role diminished, the American military increased aerial missions over Japan, destroying cities, factories, and morale. The billions of dollars

invested into newer planes like the B-29 showed the growing confidence in this relatively new weapon and its future potential. Despite the great expenses invested into battleships like Japan's *Yamato* and *Musashi*, the efforts proved fruitless. The advancements in speed, armor, and armament failed to counter the aircraft's progression, forcing battleships to find solace under air support rather than venturing out on their own. *Yamato*'s lack of action and its destruction by aircraft became reminiscent of the *Iowa* experiment, changing the mindset of military leaders around the world.

After World War II, countries no longer produced battleships, focusing more on carriers, submarines, and aircraft. Planes became first strike weapons against the Soviet Union during the Cold War, prepared to drop nuclear weapons at a moment's notice. Aircraft continue to play major roles in conflicts to this day, with the production of unmanned planes indicating its evolving future. While America kept many of her battleships until the 1990's,¹²⁵ their role remained limited. Today, many are now floating museums, reminders of how nations fought past wars for centuries.

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Origins and Consequences of Canossa:

The evolution of imperial-papal relations through the 11th century

By: Nicolas Galiffa

Introduction: Medieval Concepts of Authority and Origins of the Conflict

The relationship between the German monarchs and the Roman papacy in the Middle Ages was an accepted partnership of mutual interests. The theme and scope of this essay is to explore the historical processes that fashioned such interdependence. The origins of this relationship lies with the rise of the Franks, particularly with the coronation of Charles at the end of the 8th century, as well as the papacy's claims to the leadership of Christendom since the Fall of the West (476). Despite such mutual accord, over time this dependency would deteriorate, not necessarily due to desires for autonomy but because of assertions of dominance of one institution over the other. The inevitable culmination of this narrative is the clash between royalty and papacy in 1075 over the investiture of bishops. The claims for primacy on the part of the Bishop of Rome brought about this climax by interpreting the doctrine of the early Church in an evolving way, one of the questions addressed in this paper. However, the paper will take a broader perspective by explaining what this conflict meant for the historical development of Europe, going beyond the events at Canossa and the contemporary dialogue between emperor and pope. Later developments, however, will not be examined in detail, as that would be far too ambitious for this essay. If they are mentioned, it will only be in passing, and only to lend a visible support to the claims of the argument.

Eminent men considered the conflict between different forms of Christian authority long before the so-called 'investiture controversy.' Constantine's successor,

Constantius II (r. 337-61), was urged by Hosius of Cordova not to interfere in clerical matters.¹²⁶ The relationship, at this time, had not yet been clearly defined, and that constituted a problem for the Church giving rise to a doctrinal literature concerning the interaction of earthly rulers and the priests. Clerics whose ideas had become the basis of Church doctrine such as Augustine of Hippo (354-430) asserted the role of the clergy as the judges of morality and that earthly rulers undermined their kingly dignity by sinning and mismanagement. In the *Civitas Dei*, Augustine writes that divinely ordained earthly governments can assist mankind towards salvation but still remain inherently sinful.¹²⁷ By Augustine's theological doctrine—not only is the *saeculum* susceptible to sin, but that is its very nature. The influence of Augustinian doctrine on the reformers of Gregorian times is recognizable centuries later, but he was not the only author to be employed in their arsenal. Pope Gelasius I (r. 492-6) was the first Bishop of Rome to distinguish between regal and sacral authority in a letter to the eastern emperor, Anastasius I. Though he made the distinction, Gelasius made no assertion in his letter of the superiority of the Supreme Pontiff over the Emperor. In fact, the pope still allowed that the emperor was divinely ordained and, as far as earthly matters were concerned, responsible to the Almighty alone.¹²⁸ Pope Gregory II (r. 715-31), angered at Leo the Isaurian's interference in religious affairs, urged the Greek emperor to keep their offices separate. Leo responded, in good Byzantine fashion, "I am emperor and priest."¹²⁹ Leo was probably equally annoyed with Gregory's claims that the former Roman West was now under the guidance of the "holy prince of the apostles," a disappointing blemish on the purple of Constantinople. While it is true that one can trace the heritage of the Gregorian reforms back to these prominent and indispensable texts, it is important to note that the

authors of the 11th century should be considered innovators. Gregorian authors searched for answers from their forefathers, especially those endowed with authority of office (Gelasius) or their intellectual reputation (Augustine). Some of the ideas hearken back to their authority and that of the Gospels—but a previously existing authority pure of secular influence as conceived by the reformers in fact did not exist, as some contemporary scholars as well as the reformers themselves readily believe. While it can be put forth without effort that the papacy existed prior to Constantine's conversion and the subsequent state sponsorship of the Church, during this time it had virtually no political influence, and only with the addition of the emperor to the faithful was it allowed to blossom and achieve a degree of stability. Just two decades after the dialogue between Gregory II and the emperor Leo in the early 8th century, the clergy sought to revive the imperial title in a new context marked by ideas regarding the divine right of kings, by the papacy's development in the absence of the Byzantine emperor, and later, by the German monarchy in its evolving relationship with the *ecclesia*.

The Prince and the Apostle: Divinely Ordained Institutions

Ever since Constantine's vision before the Battle of the Milvian Bridge had the divine rights of kings been invoked. These feelings of divine obligation and ordination would be inherited by the eastern emperors and, in the absence of an imperial authority in the West, would be appropriated by the various kingdoms that established themselves there.

Writing almost five centuries after Constantine, Alcuin of York refers to Charlemagne, "In the kingly office conferred by Christ, Charles has been appointed ruler of the Christian nations. In him alone, who surpasses [the Vicar of S. Peter] in power,

and also in wisdom, resides the welfare of Christianity.”¹³⁰ In the early tenth century, Wipo of Burgundy refers to Conrad II, “Truly, by the assent of God he was elected” and “It was not, therefore, in accord with divine law for anyone on earth to fight against him whom Omnipotent God had predestined to govern all.”¹³¹ This was no private entertainment of the emperors either. When Ernest II of Swabia (r. 1015-30) staged a revolt, Conrad convinced the clergy to declare his excommunication. Seven centuries after the inception of Constantine as Emperor of Christendom, raising arms against the divinely sanctioned monarch was not just treason, but blasphemy as well.

Thietmar, Wipo’s older contemporary, employed similar language concerning Otto the Great, “the grace of heaven often revealed to the emperor what it wished to occur on earth.”¹³² Here, the connection between God and the monarch seems to be so close as to imply dialogue between them—upholding the belief in Constantine’s legendary vision. Speaking on Henry II, Thietmar states that his kingship “had been constituted by God.”¹³³ Clearer language is unnecessary. Otto of Freising, reflecting on the consecration of Charlemagne as emperor says that he was celebrated as “Charles Augustus, crowned by God,”¹³⁴ a reference to the papal and thus, divine nature of his coronation. Blumenthal believes that the relationship between pope and emperor was meant to be the “guidance of church and state as a single entity by the divinely elected, anointed emperor.”¹³⁵

The divine right is constantly emphasized in Henry IV’s condemnation of Gregory in 1076. The literature puts forth that even Peter had said to “honor the king”, an equation of the royal power as a reflection of Christ by the German court.¹³⁶ It was difficult for the medieval mind to completely reject that the monarch was the reflection of

the Savior ruling in the Kingdom of Heaven. Indeed, Christ is depicted in the garb of a Roman emperor in the mosaics of the Basilica of St. Apollinaris in Ravenna.

With Belisarius' reconquest of Italy in the mid sixth century, imperial dictation of the papacy as emanating from the emperors at Constantinople reappeared. This situation endured for the next two centuries until 751 when the Lombards dismantled the Exarchate—the bastion of imperial authority in Italy. However, the development of the papal office during the time in between deserves scrutiny in order to have sufficient understanding of the ideas of papal primacy that had become unquestionable by the eleventh century and were actively promoted by the emperors.

“[The Church] alone preserved the moral unity of Italy when the State had fallen asunder, and the fact invested her with an Imperial authority.”¹³⁷ This becomes an obvious fact when one beholds the waning of Antiquity as it coincides with the recession of the imperial yoke from the western provinces that had once enriched and honored the Eternal City. What Constantine had surely intended failed to uphold the unnaturally large *imperium*. Even Gregory the Great (r. 590-604) lamented the condition of the city in his first sermon, over a century after the deposition of Romulus Augustulus. The eastern emperors were far more concerned with maintaining their stronghold at Ravenna and, being occupied with the Persian theater, were content with inviting the Franks to relieve Italy in their stead. As a result, the pope was looked to as *de facto* regent of the Roman populace.¹³⁸ The Church fed and sustained the people. Through such dispensations as well as charitable donations, the papacy amassed enough wealth to make it the richest entity in Italy. Gradually, it would acquire lands ranging from Gaul to Illyria.¹³⁹

During his pontificate, Gregory voiced the inadequacies of the Greeks to protect Rome, mobilized the people to vigilance and defense, and even usurped powers of civil administration when the Exarch failed to act. For these reasons, he is recognized as the foremost exemplar of the pope's emerging sovereignty.¹⁴⁰ Even though he humbly referred to himself as "the servant of the Emperor" in formal addresses to Constantinople, he so impressed the king Agilolf at the peace talks of 599 that the Lombard later sent envoys to Rome instead of Ravenna. The formality of imperial supremacy still existed at this point, but the reality issued a strong sense of papal independence. Indeed, the emperor's presence in Rome had been to Lauratae. The entire framework and maintenance of civil life had been left in the hands of the popes. Imperial involvement had been reduced to merely approving of papal candidates.¹⁴¹ In fact, the emperors were so disinterested in Italy during this unfortunate period that from Pope Honorius (625) onwards, the confirmation of papal elections laid solely in the hands of the exarchs.¹⁴²

By the 640s, the Greeks had finally stemmed the Lombard tide and thus, the lack of wartime instability allowed relations with Rome to intensify. The restoration of order and the increase of "theological controversies" from the East "fanned the flame of ill-will with which the Latins regarded Greek Imperialism".¹⁴³ The papacy was ready, after a century of imperial incompetence, to stand up and assert itself against Constantinople. This certainly contains and can be summarized also as a revolt against the philosophical tendencies then prevalent in the Greek Orthodox tradition as being out of touch with events in the West. Rome was simply comfortable with security, externally with reliable protection and internally with a firm unwavering dogma. Martin I (649-53) became the first pope consecrated without imperial ratification in 649 and organized the clergy of

Italy against the theological decrees of the East. The imperial court reacted swiftly at this sudden opposition, deposing the pope and then exiling him to Crimea for the remainder of his life.¹⁴⁴ Unfortunately, for the papacy, the eastern emperors were now in a position to give Italy more attention than it had received in years prior. In 663, Constans II became the first emperor to set foot in Rome since the fall of the West.

In a sudden reversal of fortunes, Constantine IV began promoting Roman primacy against the defiance of Archbishop Theodore of Ravenna and, in 681, oversaw the Sixth Ecumenical Council condemning the Monothelite heresy. The change in disposition at Constantinople stemmed from the devastating defeats the Empire sustained at the hands of the fledgling Muhammadan armies. The stronghold of Monothelitism, Syria, was now conveniently severed from the Empire by the Arabs and to consolidate with the formerly neglected territories in the west seemed the most pragmatic maneuver.¹⁴⁵ The series of popes from the Hellenized East after Constantine IV's death in 685 makes clear the extent to which imperial control over the election process had tightened.¹⁴⁶ In 708, a Syrian nobleman even took Constantine as his papal name. Gregory II's reign is the only exception until the collapse of the Exarchate in 751.

Incidentally, the time during which this exception occupied the Petrine throne shows the first sign of a rift with the imperial court. Gregorovius suggests that the pope was still keen not to break with Leo III, who had resumed the heretical tendencies of the East, and that Gregory II was utilizing a "policy of keeping the seat of government at a distance, rather than allowing a monarchy to be established in Italy".¹⁴⁷ He also believes the "chief characteristics" of the eleventh century reforms can first be sensed in Gregory II's letters to the emperor. To magnify this further, the pope's letters even stated that

Peter is regarded amongst the Latins “as God upon earth”, indicating the belief in the superiority of the apostolic office. The pope also distinguished in a Gelasian manner between the powers of the Palace and the Church.¹⁴⁸

On the Development of the German Kingdom and its Clerical Relations

In 911, the last Carolingian king of the *regnum francorum orientalium* (thus, the German-speaking territories), Louis the Child, died without an heir. The realms that Charlemagne had brought together by the sword had already endured a fractured existence since the brotherly Treaty of Verdun (843), and the Germans recognized that an election by the first men of the kingdom was more likely to succeed than the oft-repeated Salic tradition of dividing kingdoms between the acceptable relatives. Furthermore, the option of a reinvigorated Frankish empire seemed no longer feasible. Instead, they opted to recognize Conrad of Franconia over the King of the West Franks, Charles the Simple, due to the latter’s lack of ability to provide strong military support against the wild Magyars.¹⁴⁹ Conrad was one of the most able of the nobility and, as favored by tradition, was of Frankish blood.

However, Conrad’s rule was plagued with an equally able opposition. Cooperating with his allies, Archbishop Hatto of Mainz (r. 891-913) among them,¹⁵⁰ the newly proclaimed king led several largely unsuccessful attempts to dislodge his enemies. The presence of German clergy among his loyal ranks shows that in the absence of a papacy empowered through imperial sponsorship, the clerics simply became additional players in the political intrigues of their country. Nonetheless, Conrad saw himself as the rightful and unquestionable successor to the East Frankish kings, blinding himself to the

delicate political intricacies that were recognized by his rival and successor, Henry the Fowler, *Dux saxonum* (r. 919-36).

“By waiving ecclesiastical consecration and the royal prerogative of a palace chapel, [Henry] began by avoiding overt display of the qualitative differences between royal and ducal power”.¹⁵¹ Here, Blumenthal accurately analyzes Henry’s shrewd decision in maintaining a position of *primus inter pares* after the troubled reign of his predecessor. By doing this he recognized the rights of the stem duchies while still showing that these rights emanated from the crown—a problem that Conrad never solved. Thus, the clergy remained supportive of the monarch while the ambitions of the secular princes were significantly curbed for most of his dynasty’s reign. Henry the Quarrelsome’s attempts to keep Otto III from succeeding his father can be traced to their blood relations and not the desires of some insolent vassal. The exception here is evident during the accession of the last Liudolfing, Henry II. Thietmar spoke of his troubles thus, “Indeed our dukes and counts conspired against him in many ways, not without the knowledge of the bishops” and “[Archbishop Heribert of Cologne] did not then favor him and made no effort to conceal it, but rather declared that he would freely give assent to whomever the better and greater part of the folk inclined”. According to Thietmar, Heribert’s sympathies were shared by many in Germany.¹⁵² The Bishop of Meissen accompanied his relative, the margrave Ekkehard or Eckhart, being received by Bishop Bernward of Hildesheim as the legitimate king.¹⁵³ Bishop Lambert of Constance and Ulrich of Chur, both being Swabian, supported their duke, Herman, against Henry. However, Thietmar suggests that they did so due to their geographical location and not any real political sympathies.¹⁵⁴

Nevertheless, the German clergy remained tightly bound to the office of the king (or more appropriately in the aforementioned sense, someone seeking the kingship) and did not involve itself in the concerns of the secular princes such as the assertion of ducal rights. This led certain figures such as Duke Bernhard II of Saxony to detest those clergymen who had been raised to positions of power by the king since they would represent royal interests in his territory. Bernhard “held [Archbishop Adalbert of Bremen] under suspicion because of his nobility and wisdom, often [saying] that Adalbert had been stationed in this country like a spy, to betray the weaknesses of the land to the aliens and to Caesar”.¹⁵⁵ The German kingdom, then, materialized out of a fragile relationship between the king and his independently minded vassals. The cohesive agent of this relationship, the clergy, was happy to throw in their lot with whoever seemed to provide the most security and order. The royal nature of the German clergy can be sensed in the initial Transalpine reactions to the *Dictatus papae*. Archbishops Udo of Trier, Siegfried of Worms, and Liemar of Bremen all opposed this newfound sense of papal supremacy early on.¹⁵⁶ Of course, the number of these dissenters would swell by the time of the Synod of Worms, which formally deposed the pope, the following year.

Lay investiture of the clergy was nothing particular to the early German kingdom and the empire it begat. The lack of uniformity, security, and general weakness of the papacy following the collapse of the western empire in 476 allowed secular rulers, in all their political pragmatism, to exercise lay investiture outright. In fact, the practice does not meet specific condemnation from the clergy until the reformist movement of the eleventh century. When Bishop Sigismund of Halberstadt was on his deathbed in 923, he instructed his chaplain Bernhard: “Go to the king’s court... and there, you should acquire

the favor and aid of powerful men so that you will be allowed to succeed me without opposition”.¹⁵⁷ A contemporary description of St. Ulrich of Augsburg’s investiture that same year states that the bishop paid homage to King Henry I.¹⁵⁸ When Duke Eberhard of Bavaria refused to appear before Otto I in 938, he was removed by force and replaced by his brother in exchange for granting investiture rights to the crown¹⁵⁹—evidence that such rights were not yet standardized and were simply waiting to be appropriated by powerful secular rulers without papal opposition.

Simony, or the acquisition of a clerical office through bribery, would be another issue that would gain particular attention during the Gregorian reforms. This did not always imply monetary compensation such as the purchase of the see of Basel from Conrad II by a certain Udalrich.¹⁶⁰ For example, Otto the Great invested Hildeward with Halberstadt in exchange for an agreement not to hinder the functions of Otto’s newly founded see at Magdeburg.¹⁶¹ Furthermore, in Otto’s investiture of the episcopacies along the eastern frontier, “All of these [bishops] promised obedience to him and his successors”.¹⁶² This shows that lay investiture was not necessarily the stacking of clerical offices with wealthy yet incompetent men—Otto wanted to ensure that the German clergy would remain secure as the cohesive factor of his kingdom. Thus, the ruler benefited through enhanced control of his realms while the clergy benefited through his benevolent protection, much akin to the way in which kings obtained the loyalty of feudal princes through the ceremony of homage.

A method to ensure this mutualism with certainty was the promotion of royal chaplains as candidates. Otto III did this with Halberstadt in 996¹⁶³ and Henry II with Magdeburg eight years later.¹⁶⁴ Henry also allowed a certain Walthard to become

Archbishop of Magdeburg after the latter had “swore to support him”.¹⁶⁵ However, this process was not always so smooth. Bishop Henry of Würzburg (r. 995-1018) opposed King Henry’s plans to erect a new diocese at Bamberg. The cleric did so after he realized that he would not be granted “the episcopal dignity”. In response, the king called a synod at Mainz, as had become the preferred tradition, where he told the German clergy “I beseech your most serene piety that my plan not be impeded by the absence of one who wished to obtain from me that which I had no right to concede”.¹⁶⁶ By condemning the bishop as ambitious and for hindering the growth of the Church, Henry won over the minds of the clergy. This allowed for his chaplain, Eberhard, to become the first Bishop of Bamberg in 1007.¹⁶⁷ Further proof that the king wished to keep the clergy in check was his veto of Adalbero of Trier’s election the following year. The candidate’s brother, Dietrich, had already been invested with Metz.¹⁶⁸ Although Henry certainly had royal interests in mind, it could be argued that he was also protecting the property of the Church in renouncing the rise of clerical dynasties.¹⁶⁹

On his deathbed in 1013, Archbishop Liawizo of Bremen instructed his brethren “I succeeded [Adaldag], though unworthy, by virtue of your unanimous election *and through the gift of the king*...For the welfare of our homeland, you should unanimously choose Otto, a member of your chapter, as rector of our church. And you should beseech the grace of God, *in whose hand is the heart of the king*, that he may find this agreeable”.¹⁷⁰ Here it is clear that in Ottonian times, the monarch exercised decisive control over clerical elections as a consequence of his divine representation of God’s will—in short, because *Deus vult*. Pope Benedict VIII (r. 1012-24) had just been promoted as Henry’s candidate the previous year. Thus, he had neither authority nor

interest in preventing Henry's blatant exercise of investiture. The situation in Italy required a similar pragmatism. To secure their authority in Italy, Otto III, Henry II, and their Salian successors simply loaded vacant dioceses in that country with German clergy. Being foreigners, they would naturally be obliged to rely on imperial support.¹⁷¹

On the Role of the Emperor as Defender of the Church and Overseer of its Centralization

There is perhaps no document more controversial for the medieval world, carrying such heavy political overtones, that it is essential that it be mentioned here. Scholars now know the Donation of Constantine to be a forged effort, probably from the 9th century. However, Bryce believes that Constantine's removal to *Nova Roma* in the East almost renders the falsehood of the Donation meaningless. The devastation of Italy in the 5th century and the Roman emperors who were powerless to stop it lent further support, as has been shown, to the pope's supremacy. The popes could never fully reject the emperors though, and here it is meant the emperors from Justinian onward, not the unfortunate wretches who failed to prevent the barbarian from entering Italy, as their protectors, even if they were to challenge them over issues like iconoclasm. Fimbrius of Benevento became Pope Felix IV (r. 526-30) with the encouragement of King Theodoric, who had become the predominant secular ruler in the West, after the imprisonment and subsequent death of Pope John I, whom the king had suspected of plotting with Constantinople. The papacy was strengthened under the monarch's rigidity and close involvement. Felix actively pursued the promotion of the office as supreme arbitrator between laity and clergy. This involvement "laid the foundation of the political power of the Papacy."¹⁷² When the papacy abandoned the Greeks for the Franks, Leo III bowed to Charlemagne at his coronation.¹⁷³

After the fall of the Exarchate (751), Pope Stephen II subsequently appealed to Pepin III, King of the Franks (r. 752-68), on account of the Lombard “outrages”.¹⁷⁴ Though it would be another half century until the coronation of Charlemagne, this appeal and Pepin’s reaction mark the *de facto* reemergence of the imperial title in the Latin west as he “assumed the Protectorate of the Church.”¹⁷⁵ The papacy and other figures were probably hesitant to promote its rebirth due to the radical nature of the Church granting a title it, historically speaking, had no right to confer. Thus, such language was avoided until Leo III’s near death experience with a Roman mob, the catalyst for the surprise coronation of Charlemagne in 800. This was the product both of the pope’s personal gratitude and recognition that the Frankish kings were the premier monarchs of the West. This is notwithstanding Leo’s original appeal to the Greeks¹⁷⁶—the securities of the Exarch and the Byzantine Papacy still fresh in papal memories despite the accompanying tyranny. This failure resulted in a defining moment in the history of the West, the naming of Charles as “Emperor and Defender of the Roman Church”.¹⁷⁷

But what exactly this new title implied demands explanation. In protecting the Church, the emperor was expected to confirm papal elections by the clergy of Rome. When Leo III was elected, there was neither an emperor nor an adherence to the Greeks. Thus, he notified the honorary *Patricius romanorum*, Charlemagne, of his election.¹⁷⁸ The invocation of the presence of secular legates at the consecration of John IX nearly a century later (898) is the first instance where the secular authority was to be notified of the papal selection prior to consecration. Ullman suggests that John and subsequent popes did this in their own interest, that is, to ensure papal elections were unhindered by the “unruly” Roman aristocracy even though the move was “fundamentally opposed to

the whole idea of the papal office”.¹⁷⁹ The presence of the *missi imperatoris* also implied oversight of the electoral procedure.¹⁸⁰

Roman primacy faded after the eclipse of the Carolingian empire in the late 9th century. As a result, national churches developed in its stead. Proprietary churches—those set up by secular lords and installed with clergy of their choosing—were administered as components of the feudal system. Ironically, Cluny was one of these churches though it was granted free election by its proprietor out of his Christian zeal.¹⁸¹

Let us now consider the appropriation of the emperorship by Otto the Great in the mid tenth century and its development as a distinctly German privilege. Even before they were emperors, the German kings were actively pursuing a policy of Church standardization and supervision. Adalbert of Magdeburg tells us that the monastery of St. Maximin in Trier was restored to free election by Henry the Fowler in 934 and certain problematic brothers expelled “by the king’s mercy.”¹⁸² His son acted similarly concerning the abbey of St. Nazarius in Lorsch, 956.¹⁸³ It was this Otto who at the request of the papacy, was to humble local ambitions south of the Alps once again.¹⁸⁴ He had already descended into Italy on an earlier expedition in 951 after being approached by emissaries of “the Apostolic See”¹⁸⁵ not to mention the appeals of Adelaide, widow of the last legitimate king, who gave her hand in marriage to this most promising of kings. Otto would have appeared to be the most sensible candidate after these events, notwithstanding his victory over the troublesome Magyars at Lechfeld (955). After the defeat of his enemies, John XII consecrated the Saxon king “as patron of the Roman Church”. However, both Otto and John had different connotations in mind, probably with its source in John as one of the most worldly popes in history—the charges against

him by his clerical enemies are numerous, with accusations ranging from blatant nepotism to running a brothel out of the Vatican Palace.

Pullman traces the evolution of the role of the emperor as protector of the Church under Otto to the fundamental differences between the “Roman-advocate idea” and the “Teutonic-royal idea”. The former emphasized the role of the emperor as the defender, bestowed with his title by the papacy, and propagator of the pope’s reverence. The latter, which originated with and prevailed under Charles, emphasized the divine anointment of the ruler and the defense of the Church according to his expertise¹⁸⁶, soon acquiring the imperial notion of divine right. Zema proposes a similar concept that the whole issue of lay involvement can be traced to opposition between the “*ordo Romanus*” and “Germanic particularism”.¹⁸⁷ Naturally, this led to conflict. Otto was compelled to return to Rome and depose John after the latter defected to his former enemy’s camp. Otto held a synod, the first of its kind in the Latin West, that elected an anti-pope as Leo VIII. John died in 964 still trying to defy the will of Otto through armed resistance, and the Romans elected one of their own as Benedict V, driving Leo from the city. Otto return again to Rome to set matters straight, “spurning the legates of the Romans whom they had sent to calm his anger”.¹⁸⁸ The free election of the popes by the Roman citizenry, “their one single act of civic independence” remaining, was deprived of them by Otto for the unrest stirred by John and his supporters, particularly the breaking of an oath. Indeed, no pope was present at the November Synod that formally deposed John and the emperor presided over it as the supreme ecclesiastical authority, reducing the papacy to vassalage.¹⁸⁹ On Leo VIII’s death in 965, the same legates that had previously approached Otto set off for Saxony to inquire into the king’s opinion regarding a papal successor. The emperor

promoted a member of the Crescentii, assisting him to the Lateran after a local revolt, executing the offenders, and restoring Ravenna and other cities to the papacy.¹⁹⁰

This state of affairs continued under the emperor's successors. His grandson, Otto III, was able to install his cousin Bruno as Gregory V with the consent of the electing clergy, including the monastery of Cluny, who praised this act as aiming towards the reform of the degenerate Roman Church¹⁹¹ "He received the imperial anointment from him and was made advocate of the Church of St. Peter".¹⁹² In the following year, 997, Otto was induced to come to Rome and remove the usurper John XVI who had been raised by the Roman nobility. For about a decade after Otto III's death, the patricianship reverted to the Romans, being taken up by the Crescentians. During this time, the Church was plundered and the occupants of the papal throne were mere creatures of John Crescentius.¹⁹³ Then, in 1012, Anti-pope Gregory VI sought Henry II's support against Benedict VIII (r. 1012-24). Henry promised to settle the issue in accordance with canon law and wound up approving of Benedict,¹⁹⁴ after which he was made "advocate of St. Peter".¹⁹⁵

"In the one thousand and twenty-seventh year from the incarnation of the Lord, Conrad (II) having reached Rome was crowned by the supreme pontiff".¹⁹⁶ No papal invitation was required even after the collapse of the Ottonian house (1024). The prevailing tendency by this time was to assume that the most powerful man amongst the Germans would become emperor.

Conrad's son, Henry III (r. 1039-56), would convene a synod, in the tradition of Otto, at Sutri to save the papacy from the influence of the meddling Roman nobility and thus, cement that crucial relationship. Once three claimants were sitting in Rome

simultaneously and the entire “*Dominium Temporale*” was in revolt against papal overlordship, it was pragmatically resolved that Henry would have to settle the matter. Like Henry II, Henry III assured the claimants that it would be settled canonically.¹⁹⁷ The result—all three were found unsuitable and Bishop Suidger of Bamberg was elevated to the Holy See as Clement II.¹⁹⁸ Blumenthal comments that the Synod of Sutri becomes, more than any other event, the distinctive point at which the splintered papacy was replenished and began to take on a reforming and more “universalist” nature.¹⁹⁹ From this time until the accession of Nicholas II in 1059, a period of eleven years, Rome was under strict imperial influence, most of the popes being “German by race”.²⁰⁰ This includes Leo IX, that ardent reformer who firmly established those sentiments of the “centralization of the Church under papal headship,” replacing “the former almost feudal headship” that existed prior.²⁰¹ After Henry’s death, a strong defender was absent—Henry IV still being a child under the regency of his mother Empress Agnes. Thus, the papacy sought the support of an alternative, Duke Godfrey the Bearded of Lotharingia. The Cluniac reformers, who were the more numerous party among the Roman clergy by the time of Henry’s death, elected Godfrey’s brother as Stephen IX (r. 1057-8) without imperial consent. This was hastily done both to avoid violence in the city and to challenge the legitimacy of young Henry, but Stephen died prematurely and was followed by an uncanonically-elected Tusculan as Benedict X, prompting the Roman clergy to turn to the lesser of two evils—the German king.²⁰² The papacy would seek confirmation again in the election of Nicholas II (r. 1059-61) as well.²⁰³

On the Development of Church Reform as a Revolutionary Movement

The monastery of Cluny, founded in 909, was granted by its proprietor to the direct authority and sponsorship of the papacy.²⁰⁴ Ironically, Otto the Great attempted to make Cluny's abbot his papal candidate at one time.²⁰⁵ The emperor saw no problem in the intermingling of Rome with foreign churches, seeing this as a method of standardization²⁰⁶ that increased the prestige of his position, which derived its legitimacy from the blessing of the Roman pontiff. Cooperation between the emperor and the papacy, especially as concerns the extension and strengthening of the papal network and its orthodoxy, was essential in curbing the power of political rivals and their instigations. Otto probably viewed this as advantageous in the same light as Constantine presiding over the Council of Nicaea to standardize the universal faith.

The papacy of course favored such standardization as a means to its own empowerment. In 1024, popes Benedict VIII and John XIX defended Cluny against the complaints of the Bishop of Mâcon as well as the archbishops of Lyons and Vienne the following year.²⁰⁷ This shows that the popes fortunate enough to live in an era where their office greatly benefited from imperial sponsorship, wanted to crush or at least suppress the idea of a clerical legitimacy separate from Rome.²⁰⁸ Eventually though, such standardization and the attempts to realize the ideals of a universal Church would begin to run counter to the position of the emperors who had grown comfortable with their powers after so many centuries. Cardinal Humbert of Silva Candida (d. 1061) wrote in his *Libri tres adversus simoniacos* that heretical simony was caused by secular influence in the Church, stating that lay authorities had forgotten their place and were motivated by the acquisition of church property. After all, how could the Bride of Christ accept the

domination of a worldly ruler untutored in the salvation of souls? This opinion condemned Henry III's synod at Sutri as uncanonical and lay investiture as a pretext to simony.²⁰⁹ Later, Gregory VII and his entourage, in their reformist nature, adopted such views and promoted the office of pope as the figure to whom secular rulers were subordinate. Blumenthal believes this to be an evolution of the "Gelasian doctrine,"²¹⁰ an evolution placing greater emphasis on papal descent from St. Peter. Gregory's insistence that lay involvement in the Church cease would bewilder Henry IV and his court, being the catalyst to the conflict that cracked the foundations of the Empire.

I am of the disposition that the Gregorian reforms and the evolved Gelasian doctrine that he advocated were revolutionary insofar as that while the reformers utilized early Church doctrine for their basis, it cannot be ignored that the passage of so many centuries molded these beliefs to meet the more practical political needs of our era. Though Gregory VII and his supporters avoided language about reform and preferred their agenda to be called a *renovatio*,²¹¹ an argument holding that the reformers' citing of Scripture to promote their ends proves a revival of the Church along the lines of a more pure and dignified past are not convincing. This, I believe, is a fiction conjured by the spirit of that time, which would certainly prove the aforementioned argument correct about the ideals of the reform, and so long espoused by the most orthodox of the clergy, being actualized finally under Gregory. The imperial court could also look to Scripture for justification. By the imperial view, the authority of the universal Empire persisted since time immemorial while the universal Church was later in conception. This does not imply an opinion that the Church should have unquestionably accepted its subordination, in fact just the opposite—that both offices had separate functions with lay investiture

traditionally lying within the rights of the *saeculum*. It is known that the western emperors of the 5th century confirmed and ratified papal elections. Odoacer was able to claim this right in 483 upon the death of Pope Simplicius, the last pope to don the pallium before the fall of the West.²¹² During the schism of 498 between the popes Symmachus and Lawrence, the Roman and Byzantine candidates respectively, it was the secular authority at hand, King Theodoric, who settled the issue at his court in Ravenna.²¹³

Hildebrand (Gregory VII) noted that in John, Christ says that He is “the truth” and not “custom.”²¹⁴ This clearly shows that a Christianity devoid of external perversion (heresy), in principle, elevates the priestly caste as propagators of the Word and as guides of mankind towards salvation over any tradition that existed prior. But what the reformist pope was calling for was actually something hitherto unrealized—a Church standing above and outside of custom. The historical reality was that the Church had gained its legitimacy through the grace of Constantine.²¹⁵ Still, Hildebrand shrewdly propagated that it was the lay rulers who had strayed from the *sanctorum patrum doctrinam*. The only concession on this matter was that his *renovatio* would be achieved via *nova consilia*.²¹⁶

The violent momentum that the Gelasian doctrine had gained under the reformed papacy is evident in a correspondence between Gregory and Bishop Herman of Metz in 1081. The pope calls the German king “a destroyer...of the Empire.” He puts forth the familiar themes of a spiritual authority superior to and influencing all earthly rulers with divine judgment, comparing Henry to Satan “tempting the High Priest Himself, the head of priests...promising Him all the kingdoms of the earth.”²¹⁷ He also appropriately quotes Pope Gelasius and suggests that the lay rulers should be restrained, looking to humble

Constantine as an adequate Christian example. However, what the zealous Hildebrand failed to take into account is that, even though Constantine “did not presume to give any sentence of judgment” and “that he hung on [the priests’] decision” at Nicaea,²¹⁸ the emperor may have not cared to dictate the finer points of the universally binding faith and that he would have been concerned with maintaining the universal empire. Tellenbach acknowledges that Gregory VII actually understood the papal office and its Scriptural support more logically than any man who had worn the vestments before him. If the spiritual presence of God’s manifestation, Christ, is maintained in the world by the clergy, then the highest cleric is God’s chosen representative on earth.²¹⁹

The Imperial-Papal Fiasco under Henry IV

It would be Henry’s excessive involvement in the clerical affairs of Milan that brought the conflict to a head.²²⁰ In 1072, Henry appointed a different candidate than the one proposed by Pope Alexander II (r. 1061-73). This was only renounced during Gregory’s pontificate once things in Germany began to stir up again. Gregory and his supporters issued a bull in 1075 to summarize their goals. The *Dictatus papae* stipulates that only the pope is to be referred to as “universal,” that he alone has the powers to instate and remove bishops from their benefices, to partition bishoprics, “that he alone can use *imperial* insignia,” that only his feet are to be kissed by the secular princes, only his name is to be recited in the churches as opposed to lay rulers, denounces the Synod of Sutri, and insists on both the primacy and infallibility of the Roman pontiff.²²¹ The following year, Henry declared Gregory deposed at Worms. When Henry subsequently refused to recant, Gregory excommunicated him. The inevitable outcome was the infamous episode at Canossa. In 1077, Henry did penance in the garb of a beggar outside

Gregory's stronghold in order to regain control over the crown lands in Germany which had fallen into disarray. Otto the Great had once wept at the sight of a pope submitting to his will. Now, Pope Gregory did the same upon beholding the humbled king standing in the snow outside the ramparts.²²² With his excommunication lifted, Henry regained the legitimacy against eager rivals from the ranks of the nobility, which were always in abundance. Indeed, when the seemingly reinvigorated king returned from across the Alps he was then free to clean house. This formal maneuver also prevented Gregory's direct intervention in Germany where he was scheduled to settle the dispute between Henry and the disaffected nobles at Augsburg.

However, despite the monarchy's recovery, with Henry's prostration at Canossa, historians such as Blumenthal have argued that the emperorship had been "deprived of its sacralty".²²³ Bryce holds a similar view, that while saving Germany from upheaval, Henry's penitence "was enough to mark a decisive change, and inflict an irretrievable disgrace on the crown so abased...Its wearer could no more, with the same lofty confidence, claim to be the highest power on earth".²²⁴ Henry's subsequent deposition of Gregory at the Brixen Synod in 1080 is, thus, of marginal consequence. He obtained the imperial insignia from his creature Clement III and continued to act as if all was in good order, remaining aloof to the blow struck upon the crown. "The first Italian expedition of the son of that Henry III under whose iron hosts Italy had trembled" was thus, the disgrace of Canossa.²²⁵

Conclusion

Indeed the conflict between Church and Empire and the resulting loosening of ties between the papacy and the emperor led both institutions to their demise. Though

Christendom was both reluctant and unready to set the emperor aside, with the casting out of the secular ruler into “temporality”²²⁶ the papacy lost its Constantine. In the figure of the emperor, the Church saw not only the hope of a triumphant Christendom but a tangible authority, an overseer of the Truth, an able participant, a recognizable symbol to preside over the decisions of the priests, and a trustworthy proponent of Christian stability.²²⁷ Though the conciliations reached between Henry's son and the papacy of Paschal II did temporarily relieve the situation in the twelfth century, the debate and conflict that had been the source of the ghastly tumult ultimately reopened the critical wound. After Henry V (r. 1099-1125), the monarch's powers in the German crown lands were greatly diminished by “the totality of princes and barons”, the evolution of the elective principle gradually stifling what primacy remained.²²⁸

The papacy, doing without its protective overseer for temporal supremacy would soon enough abuse its worldliness while the emperors gradually lost the ability to control affairs on both sides of the Alps. The use of physical and military force by various popes after the Gregorian reforms, while originally having spiritual objectives, led to the papacy's falling away from functional relevance in a Europe beginning to behold the strictly political State as the supreme authority. While Gregory's end was the reform of the Church and the supremacy of Rome, by the mid thirteenth century Innocent IV's (r. 1243-54) goal was the complete subjugation of the imperial power. This worldly ambition was fundamentally transformed in early modern Europe when the popes found themselves confined to the heartland of Italy without the means to dictate the decisions and minds of the newly invigorated monarchs in France, Spain, and England.²²⁹ “The potentates of Europe beheld in the Papacy a force which, if dangerous to themselves,

could be made to repel the pretensions and baffle the designs of the strongest among them”.²³⁰ Along these lines, the Italian cities used papal sanctions to declare their rights against the emperor’s decrees and defy his authority with impunity. The rebellious among the German nobility could extract concessions from the monarchy as evident in Rudolph of Rheinfelden’s (anti-king 1077-80) agreement to discontinue hereditary kingship. The papacy became merely a tool to be used by all who chose to advance their civic independence at the expense of the emperor.

The Investiture Conflict, which split much of Europe politically, naturally had significant scholarly effects as well. The clash between Henry and Gregory gave rise to an emerging class of legal scholars in the following century. Once canon law was more clearly defined, the need to revive Roman law in order to defend the imperial position, or more appropriately, to prevent the popes from influencing the temporal realm, arose.²³¹ Azo of Bologna, active about a century after Gregory’s feud with Henry, wrote that jurisprudence “effects that the professors of law rule solemnly over the *orbis terrarum* and sit in the imperial court.” Henry of Bracton employed similar language in his work *De legibus*, first produced in the early thirteenth century.²³² The presence of these jurists at the royal courts was gradually subsuming the monarchs’ powers as judges, as they became more reliant on men of law. Were the monarchs reduced to mere figureheads by the fifteenth century? Kantorowicz certainly does not believe so. “None of the kings of England is seen to give judgment by his own lips, yet all judgments of the realm are his,” says the legal scholar John Fortescue. The ‘investiture conflict’ thus, not only had serious ramifications within the boundaries of the Empire, its effects rippled through all of Christendom. By the time of the Avignon Residency, the new judicial science had

begun to associate the imperial dignity with the *senatus et populus romanum*, depriving the popes of their most evident claim to temporal authority. Thus, Louis the Bavarian was crowned in 1328 on the Capitoline by the Roman people.²³³ This, of course, was no victory for the imperial court as it was in its interest to receive the diadem from a puppet in St. Peter's. The emperor's authority now rested on the whims of a civic body, not the despotic relationship that began with Charlemagne and Leo. The legal revival and scholarly debates molded the king into the *rex legislator* as opposed to the *rex iustus* of previous centuries.²³⁴ It also led to the doctrine that "a king not recognizing a superior is emperor within his realm"—in other words, the earliest formulations of the modern nation state.²³⁵

Thus, the relationship that developed between the two institutions, in the context of medieval world was doomed from the outset. The revolt of the papacy against the emperors was a consequence of its temporal enhancement and the guarantee of that enhancement by the emperors themselves. In considering the pope a vassal—as it would be difficult to argue that the Donation of Pepin and its confirmation by later emperors was anything but a feudal bestowal of land for political service—the emperor had added yet another ambitious underling, and this one all the more dangerous. Both the Church and the Empire were destined to undermine each other in a world that begged for an authority, idealized universalism, and still clung to the evermore civilized *Imperium Romanum* of the past. The question that broke the imperial-papal structure was "Who?" Who is the true Vicar of Christ charged with carrying out duties in His name? The only choices the medieval mind could fathom were Caesar or Peter.

Endnotes

- ¹ L. Elliott, *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Medieval Papacy* (London: Methmen, 1934), 19.
- ² Gerd Tellenbach, *Church, State and Christian Society at the Time of the Investiture Contest*, trans. R.F. Bennett (Toronto: U. Toronto, 1991), 28.
- ³ Tellenbach, 35.
- ⁴ *Dictionary of the Middle Ages*, vol. 9, s.v. "Papacy, Origins and Development of."
- ⁵ Ferdinand Gregorovius, *History of the City of Rome in the Middle Ages* (New York: AMS, 1967), 2: 487-8.
- ⁶ Wipo of Burgundy, *The Deeds of Conrad II*, in *Imperial Lives and Letters of the Eleventh Century*, ed. Robert L. Benson. (New York: Columbia U., 1967), 65-6.
- ⁷ Thietmar of Merseburg, *Ottonian Germany: The Chronicle of Thietmar of Merseburg*, ed. David A. Warner (New York: Manchester U., 2001), 112.
- ⁸ *Ibid.*, 357.
- ⁹ Otto of Freising, *The Two Cities: A Chronicle of Universal History to the Year 1146 A.D.*, eds. Charles C. Mierow, Austin P. Evans, and Charles Knapp (New York: Octagon, 1966), 353.
- ¹⁰ Uta-Renate Blumenthal, *The Investiture Controversy: Church and Monarchy from the Ninth to the Twelfth Century* (Philadelphia: U. Pennsylvania, 1988), 49.
- ¹¹ Henry's Letter Condemning Gregory VII (1076), in *The Investiture Controversy: Issues, Ideals, and Results*, ed. Karl F. Morrison (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1971), 49.
- ¹² Gregorovius, 2: 4.
- ¹³ *Ibid.*, 36-9.
- ¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 57.
- ¹⁵ Edward Gibbon, *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, ed. Hans-Friedrich Müller (New York: Modern Library, 2003), 798-9.
- ¹⁶ Gregorovius, 2: 63-5.
- ¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 116-7.
- ¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 139.
- ¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 145-8.
- ²⁰ *Ibid.*, 165-7.
- ²¹ *Ibid.*, 175.
- ²² *Ibid.*, 230.
- ²³ *Ibid.*, 232-5.
- ²⁴ Blumenthal, 30.
- ²⁵ Thietmar, 72.
- ²⁶ Blumenthal, 31.
- ²⁷ Thietmar, 186-8.
- ²⁸ Thietmar, 208.
- ²⁹ Thietmar, 214.
- ³⁰ Adam of Bremen, *History of the Archbishops of Hamburg-Bremen*, trans. Francis J. Tschan (New York: Columbia U., 1959), 118
- ³¹ Tellenbach, 143.
- ³² Thietmar, 83-4.
- ³³ Gerhard of Augsburg, *How Ulrich Became Bishop of Augsburg, ca. 993*, in *Power and the Holy in the Age of the Investiture Contest: A Brief History with Documents*, ed. Maureen C. Miller (New York: Bedford, 2005), 60.
- ³⁴ Blumenthal, 33.
- ³⁵ Wipo, 74.
- ³⁶ Thietmar, 106-7.
- ³⁷ Thietmar, 108.
- ³⁸ Thietmar, 170.
- ³⁹ Thietmar, 232.

- 40 Thietmar, 261.
- 41 Apparently King Henry felt uneasy about needlessly empowering clergymen with whom he was already not well acquainted, though the language about the royal right is contradictory to the realities of the Ottonian period.
- 42 Thietmar, 257-8.
- 43 Thietmar, 261.
- 44 Which was in line with the agenda of the Cluniac reformers who would surface a half century later.
- 45 Thietmar, 296.
- 46 Blumenthal, 55-6.
- 47 Gregorovius, 1: 342-3.
- 48 James Bryce, "The Papacy: Master of the Field," in Morrison, 85.
- 49 Otto, 347.
- 50 Gregorovius, 2: 263.
- 51 The fact that Constantinople was under the sway of a woman at the time should be noted.
- 52 Notker the Stammerer, *Two Lives of Charlemagne*, trans. David Ganz (New York: Penguin, 2008), 76-7.
- 53 Walter Ullman, "The Origins of the Ottonianum," *Cambridge Historical Journal* 11, no. 1 (1953): 115.
- 54 Ibid., 118-19.
- 55 Ibid., 120.
- 56 Tellenbach, 72-3.
- 57 Simon MacLean, ed., *History and Politics in Late Carolingian and Ottonian Europe: The Chronicle of Regino of Prüm and Adalbert of Magdeburg* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 241.
- 58 Ibid., 258.
- 59 The Frankish lord of Ivrea having usurped the Iron Crown and attempting to dominate Italian affairs through sheer treachery.
- 60 Otto, 382.
- 61 Ullman, 127.
- 62 Demetrius B. Zema, "The Issue of Property: Difficulties within the Roman See," in Morrison, 24-5.
- 63 Otto, 383-5.
- 64 Gregorovius, 3: 342-3.
- 65 MacLean, 268-71.
- 66 Gregorovius, 3: 410.
- 67 Thietmar, 171.
- 68 Gregorovius, 4: 12.
- 69 Henry obviously wanted to deliberate between the candidates and had his own imperial coronation in mind.
- 70 Thietmar, 304.
- 71 Otto, 389.
- 72 Gregorovius, 4: 52-4.
- 73 Adam, 120.
- 74 Blumenthal, 55.
- 75 Otto, 397.
- 76 Z.N. Brooke, "The Issue of Law: Conflict of Churches," in Morrison, 9.
- 77 Tellenbach, 108.
- 78 Blumenthal, 84-6.
- 79 Blumenthal, 11.
- 80 Blumenthal, 13.
- 81 Blumenthal, 18.
- 82 Blumenthal, 17.
- 83 Though this is inherent in the historical nature of the Church it is wise to remember that even for a long time after its power in this regard was severely limited.
- 84 Blumenthal, 89-90.
- 85 Blumenthal, 117-8.
- 86 Gerald B. Ladner, "Gregory Sought to Revive the Ancient Spirit of the Church," in Morrison, 52.

- ⁸⁷ Gregorovius, 1: 261.
- ⁸⁸ Ibid., 271.
- ⁸⁹ Ladner, 54.
- ⁹⁰ Any debate over the role of divine inspiration or ordination, which the reformers were fond of, is unnecessary as it suffices to say that Constantine as emperor was the active body in initiating the historical adoption of the Christian religion by the Roman civilization.
- ⁹¹ Ladner, 58.
- ⁹² *Gregory's Second Letter to Bishop Herman of Metz (1081)*, in Morrison, 41-2.
- ⁹³ Ibid., 42.
- ⁹⁴ Tellenbach, 160.
- ⁹⁵ Blumenthal, 121.
- ⁹⁶ *Dictatus papae (1075)*, in Morrison, 38-9.
- ⁹⁷ Gregorovius, 4: 208-9.
- ⁹⁸ Blumenthal, 122-5.
- ⁹⁹ Bryce, 87-8.
- ¹⁰⁰ Gregorovius, 4: 206.
- ¹⁰¹ Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde. *State, Society and Liberty*, trans. J.A. Underwood. (New York: Berg, 1991), 30.
- ¹⁰² It is already clear by the mid 4th century, especially from the Vita of St. Antony, that heretical misinterpretation is the main threat to the Church.
- ¹⁰³ Bryce, 90.
- ¹⁰⁴ Arnold J. Toynbee, "The Downfall of the Papacy" in Morrison, 124-5.
- ¹⁰⁵ Bryce, 90.
- ¹⁰⁶ Ernst H. Kantorowicz, "Kingship under the Impact of Scientific Jurisprudence," in *Twelfth Century Europe and the Foundations of Modern Society*, eds. Marshall Clagett, Gaines Post and Robert Reynolds (Madison, WI: U. Wisconsin, 1961), 90.
- ¹⁰⁷ Ibid., 92.
- ¹⁰⁸ Ibid., 93-5.
- ¹⁰⁹ Ibid., 99.
- ¹¹⁰ Ibid., 103.

Forces of the 1890s and the Philippine Solution

By: Adam Gertz

“Not quite yet, gentlemen! Before you go, I would like to say just a word about the Philippine business,” William McKinley said eagerly as he abruptly stopped the members of a Methodist missionary society who had arrived at the White House for a presidential visit.²³⁶ The United States, a year removed from the Treaty of Paris of 1898, had won its war against Spain; thus, in the opinion of the population, had successfully liberated Cuba from Spanish grasp. Domestically, post Civil War America of the 1890s was on the fringes of the Gilded Age and an economic depression to boot. Remnants of the past lingered throughout the country as racism led to mob lynching of African Americans on a regular basis. This was occurring even as those struck hardest by the depression were looking for new ways to encourage economic development. While all of this was stirring thoughts and mounting tensions, the population had to also come to terms with the closing frontier land. Without the frontier, westward expansion would come to an end. Internationally, imperial powers were carving out their share of China to secure a position in East Asian markets. The Spanish-American War had left the U.S. with Cuba, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippine archipelago off the coast of Asia; and had possibly left the U.S. with a response to the political climate of the 1890s. With that in mind, McKinley continued to say:

I thought first we would take only Manila; then Luzon; then other islands, perhaps also...I went down on my knees and prayed Almighty God for light and guidance...and one night late it came to me...(1) That we could not give them back to Spain—that would be cowardly and dishonorable; (2) that we could not turn them over to France or Germany—that would be bad business and discreditable; (3) that we could not leave them to themselves—they were unfit for government...and (4) that there was nothing left for us to do but to take them all, and to educate the Filipinos,

and uplift and civilize and Christianize them and by God's grace do the very best we could by them.²³⁷

The decision to annex the Philippines was not an easy one because this decision would create a new title for the U.S. That title was imperialist power. The country had, up to that point, leaned toward isolationism and Philippine retention would alienate many of the principles the U.S. had previously stood for regarding foreign policy. It was for that reason that a huge debate among the populace arose in regard to handling the Philippines. But what ultimately led to Philippine retention? What were the benefits of retention and how did they outweigh the possible problems it might create? In McKinley's explanation lie several forces of pressure that arose as the Philippines were handed to the U.S., and the answer lies within an explanation of such. Such forces that led to the decision of Philippine annexation were economic recovery in response to the depression, foreign strategy in response to the threat of the Open Door with China closing, and racism that ran rampant throughout post Civil War America.

The Spanish-American War

"You furnish the pictures and I'll furnish the war."²³⁸ These were the words of William Randolph Hearst as wired to an artist he hired to document the goings on in Cuba during its fight for independence against Spain. Upon arrival in Cuba, the artist wired to Hearst, "Everything is quiet. There is no trouble here. There will be no war. I wish to return."²³⁹ The response from Hearst to his artist signifies the emergence of Yellow Journalism in the United States and equally exemplifies the beginning of U.S. involvement in world affairs and eventual empire via the Spanish-American war. Economic hardship was placing strain on the entire country during the 1890s. Along with all other dominant industries of the era, economic strain geared itself toward the

newspaper industry. As urgency and competition to sell newspapers brewed between Hearst and his rival Joseph Pulitzer, the two moguls looked for new means in which to outperform the other. The competition between the two gave way for yellow journalism, which utilizes sensationalism in its stories to entice and mislead the reader.

The perfect setting for yellow journalism to thrive was the Cuban fight for independence from Spain that began in 1895. American newspapers used tales of Spanish atrocities and treatment of Cuban revolutionaries to encourage public outrage and, most importantly, an increase in the sale of newspapers. While the Spanish were not innocent by any means, as one fourth of the population in Cuba had died as a result of the Cuban Revolution by 1898, many of the stories told by American newspapers were either partially true or complete fabrications.²⁴⁰

The culmination of all the sensationalism and public outrage occurring as a result of the Cuban fight for independence took place on February 15, 1898. That evening, the U.S.S. Maine blew up in Havana Harbor killing 267 sailors. Although a cause was never determined, the newspapers ran front-page stories of the explosion that was assumed to be the handiwork of the Spanish. Placing the blame on the Spanish, the outraged American population let the slogan “Remember the Maine” fuel their outrage and force the U.S. government to act swiftly. War was declared on Spain a few months later in April.²⁴¹

The U.S. strategy in the war was to attack the Spanish on several fronts. Troops were landed in Cuba while Admiral George Dewey led a U.S. naval fleet to Manila Bay in the Philippines. Upon the inception of the war, Assistant Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt resigned from his position to lead a cavalry regiment known as the

Rough Riders through the Cuban hills to fight against the Spanish. While Roosevelt gained heroic status, the U.S. was dominating the war as Spain surrendered less than a month after troops landed in Cuba. Not only did the Spanish suffer defeat in Cuba but, because of poor communication and with the help of Filipino insurgents, they were also subdued by Dewey and his fleet in Manila Bay five days after the war resolution with Spain was signed.²⁴²

The decisive American victory brought with it the provisions of the Treaty of Paris. This entailed that Spain give up all rights to Cuba, surrender Puerto Rico and its possessions in the West Indies, surrender Guam to the U.S., and surrender the Philippines to the U.S. for a payment of \$20 million. The territory of the Philippines brought about a unique opportunity for the U.S. With the archipelago in U.S. possession, the country was now one step closer to the East, most importantly China. This group of islands that, prior to the war, were not even known by most of the American population, was to create quite a stir among the U.S. population after the war.

There were, of course, those against the idea of retaining the Philippines. This argument was housed in anti-imperialists thought. The anti-imperialists were fashioned to be, more often than not, Democrats or “mugwumps” or politically independent. These anti-imperialists were also an older group who represented the previous era in which ideas of isolationism held strong and imperialism was not an option.²⁴³ Despite this group’s efforts to prevent Philippine retention, the culmination of internal and external forces in light of the crises occurring in 1890s America was far too convincing for President McKinley and so the archipelago was to be annexed.

Economic Recovery

From an economic standpoint, the 1890s found the U.S. at the end of a century of immense industrial growth. Just over two decades removed from the Civil War, the country had abolished slavery leaving the South in economic shambles and was looking for a way to sustain economic growth. With immigration to the U.S. increasing at exponential rates, new U.S. citizens needed work. In the prime of the Gilded Age, big businesses utilized immigrants' needs by employing them to serve their booming railroad, steel and oil industries. This era in U.S. history spanning from the 1870s to the 1890s brought about the transition of the U.S. from a rural agriculturally based economy to that of an urban industrialized economy. Therefore, economic sustenance came in the form of big business. Throughout the country, immigrants as well as displaced workers were flocking to newly built factories, textile and steel mills, oil refineries, and coal mines with men like John D. Rockefeller and Andrew Carnegie getting rich in the process. At the same time these two men were building their fortunes, workers began to realize that they were stuck in what seemed like serfdom. Many lived in small towns that were built by these big businessmen called factory towns and had to pay rent or work to maintain their housing. Systems like this left the workers in perpetual debt to their superiors consequently binding the workers to their work and the will of their superiors. Situations like these, along with horrendous working conditions caused workers to organize and fight back. Events like the Homestead Lockout of 1892 created a rise in tensions among workers, their superiors, and the government. The Homestead Lockout saw workers refuse to work over the right to unionize, thus pitting Carnegie steelworkers against hired

Pinkertons. The lockout led to the takeover of Homestead Mills by the Pennsylvanian National Guard.²⁴⁴ Despite the problems that arose because of big business, the government realized their importance to the post Civil War economy. This was the case so much so that Secretary of State under McKinley Administration John Hay felt compelled to comment that, “This is a government of the people, by the people, and for the people no longer. It is a government of corporations, by corporations, and for corporations...”²⁴⁵

Amplifying the growing tensions among workers, their bosses, and the government was an economic depression. This created an enormous group of people without jobs to add to the already massive numbers of angry workers. Beginning in 1893 and lasting for more than four years, the depression left nearly half of the workforce out of work. Americans across the country were without work, without shelter, and without food. Devoid of so much, these unemployed, just as the workers had done, began to organize. This organization of the unemployed came in the form of Coxey’s army. Jacob S. Coxey of Ohio, who was well off financially, became the leader and a face for the movement and organization of the unemployed guiding thousands on a march to Washington, D.C. in the spring of 1894. Unfortunately, for Coxey along with the rest of the unemployed, government allegiance was vested with big business. Their march upon Washington was met with police baring nightsticks in hand and, without hesitation, Coxey along with other demonstrators was arrested.

To cure the economic ailments of the times, the country began to take a new direction economically and look outward. Expansionism seemed to be the growing sentiment spreading throughout the U.S. and found its way into the country’s economics.

Prior to this, the country had remained predominately isolated from global affairs, but with the economic crisis of the 1890s paired with an uproar from the working class, it was time for a change. The possibilities offered by markets in East Asia, specifically China, and by Latin America captivated Americans, and for many, seemed to be the solution to the country's economic woes. The thoughts and ideology of the time held that these foreign markets would house consumers of the nation's surplus goods. As a champion of this ideology and profound imperialist, Senator Albert Beveridge depicted China as containing "illimitable markets."²⁴⁶ These foreign markets were the key to economic recovery as the imperialistic journalist Charles Conant states, "new outlets for American capital and new opportunities for American enterprises" were crucial.²⁴⁷ Secretary of the Treasury during the Cleveland Presidency, John Carlisle also realized the importance of economic expansion; "prosperity...depends largely upon [its] ability to sell [its] surplus products from foreign markets at remunerative prices."²⁴⁸ With "illimitable markets" consuming the country's surplus, thus increasing exports, it was believed that corporations around the U.S. could resume full productivity and employment. Not only could foreign markets benefit the U.S. through consumption of surplus goods, but as understood by Frederick Emory of the State Department, China was "one of the most promising fields for American enterprise, industry, and capital."²⁴⁹ In the words of H.W. Brands, "the notion of hundreds of millions of consumers in the hinterland hungering for American products only gained attractiveness."²⁵⁰

Although the salvation for America's economy seemed to be understood, expansion was not the solution for all. The opposition fueled itself behind Constitutionalism, racism, and the notions that expansionism would lead to imperialism.

Imperialism, to the anti-imperialist, meant a breach of the Constitution because imperialism, in most cases, neglected the ideal of consent of the governed. Anti-imperialists were also concerned about the entrance of people from foreign markets into the U.S. The mindset of the opposition was that the country, already booming with immigrants, could not handle any more foreigners entering the country. This would allow people of a lower race and class to compete for scarce jobs with white Americans who had already been in the country. Not only were the anti-imperialists defending the working class, but also the upper echelon as well. Men like Andrew Carnegie joined the anti-imperialist cause fearing that cheap labor in foreign markets would put him out of business.

Despite a large following that gathered behind the anti-imperialist movement, the options for economic salvation were scant. The opposition did not seem to offer any solutions for the problems, instead just arguing against the resolutions on the table. The choices for the U.S. in their recovery efforts came down to two. According to Carlisle, the options were to “export and sell their commodities in foreign markets” or to “ship gold.”²⁵¹ The second alternative was clearly not an option. Carlisle, realizing this stated it sarcastically, thus implying that there was only one source of economic recovery, and that was found in foreign markets.

While the debate ensued, the U.S. sparked its trade with East Asia. In the early part of the decade, exports to China and Japan reached approximately \$4 million and \$3.9 million. With the benefits of exporting surplus goods to this part of the world, these numbers quickly rose to \$6.9 million in China and \$7.6 million in Japan in 1896.

Proving the significance of this trade to economic recovery, exports skyrocketed the following year with \$11.9 million and \$13 million in China and Japan.²⁵²

Vesting the export of U.S. surplus goods into foreign markets was to be the solution imposed for economic recovery. As the exports were clearly overflowing into the markets of East Asia, a new demand arose. To gain a step on the foreign competition that the European powers established in the East Asian markets, the U.S. now needed a stepping-stone. Enter the Spanish-American War. After the U.S. defeat of the Spanish in Cuba and, with the help of Filipino nationalists, in the Philippines, the U.S. was given that opportunity. Attached to the war resolution by Congress, in order to appease the anti-imperialist Democrats, was the Teller Amendment, which forbade the annexation of Cuba. A large disappointment for many expansionists and imperialists, all hope was not lost as the Teller Amendment made no mention of the Philippines.²⁵³ It was realized that the Philippines could be the foothold that the U.S. needed in the Pacific to play a significant role in the “illimitable markets” of East Asia. A figure in the forefront for retention of the Philippines, Senator Albert Beveridge argued:

Our largest trade must be with Asia. The Pacific is our ocean. More and more Europe will manufacture the most it needs, secure from its colonies the most it consumes. Where shall we turn for consumers of our surplus? Geography answers the question. China is our natural customer. She is nearer to us than to England, Germany, or Russia, the commercial powers of the present and the future....The Philippines gives us a base at the door of the entire East.²⁵⁴

The importance of a foothold to the East grew ever pressing as the Philippines dangled within reach of U.S. retention.

The archipelago not only offered a significant foothold needed to compete in the East Asian markets, but the Philippine Islands were also believed to house a wealth of

natural resources and cheap labor. In an annual report of the Philippine Commission to McKinley prior to annexation, this very point was argued.

These resources are practically unlimited, and when the islands shall have been fully explored and brought under subjection to modern rule, the country will probably be found to be the richest unexplored territory in the known world. When we think of the immense sums constantly being spent in prospecting unknown lands, and in many cases without locating a “find” worth following up, it is simply amazing that here, where untold riches are staring us in the face, capitalist should have so long held aloof and fought shy of the place.²⁵⁵

In that same report, a glimpse into each island and the natural resources they could provide was taken. The report looks at Luzon and deemed it a “rich and extensive tobacco country,” while to the south, “the two Ilocos provinces are rich sugar and rice lands.” Continuing to “the long range of mountain practically unexplored,” the lands were believed to contain “copper, iron, gold, and other metal and minerals,” and these resources were supposed to exist “in considerable quantities.”²⁵⁶ Along with the “considerable quantities” of valuable natural resources, the Philippines also were home to an estimated 10 million people. To the U.S., this massive population meant one thing: cheap labor. The Filipinos were viewed as an inferior race, a concept that will later be elaborated upon. Because of this view, the exploitation of the population was an option proposed without much domestic resistance. Realizing the possibilities that Filipino labor could potentially create for the U.S., the Philippine Commission, in an annual report to the President regarded the archipelago as a place “where cheap labor and plenty of it is their lifeblood.”²⁵⁷

The stage was now set for the decision to be made to retain the Philippines. As with the rest of the country, President McKinley could not fail to see the possibilities and solutions for economic recovery offered by East Asian markets, and with the trends of

exporting surplus goods to these markets continuously increasing during the last decade of the nineteenth century, it was evident that the East would continue to play a significant role in American economics. As discussed, with retention, the Philippine Islands offered three significant advantages to the U.S. from an economic standpoint. These advantages were a foothold in the East Asian “illimitable markets,” a wealth of natural resources, and a source of cheap labor. Economically, McKinley could not pass on the retention of the Philippines, and in the words of the powerful Republican Senator who was to become the face of the imperialist movement among the Senate, Henry Cabot Lodge, “the arguments in favor of the Philippines seem to me so overwhelming that I should regard their loss as a calamity to our trade and commerce and to all our business interests so great that no man can measure it.”²⁵⁸

Influential Thought

To understand the role that foreign strategy played on the ultimate decision for the U.S. to retain the Philippines, an understanding of the ideology and thought of the times is first necessary. Three main influential thinkers of the time had a lasting impact in regards to foreign strategy on America as a whole with their writings. These three men were Alfred Thayer Mahan, Fredrick Jackson Turner, and Brooks Adams.

The first of this trio to have an influence through the publication of their work was Mahan. In Mahan’s *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783* published in 1890, he analyzed the effect of “sea power” or naval power in historical events and drew several compelling conclusions. These conclusions were to set the foundation in which many foreign navies, like Japan, framed themselves, as well as how the U.S. was to later approach the question of Philippine annexation. Through his analysis, Mahan

found that throughout the time period he analyzed, industrial expansion led to rivalry for markets and raw materials. This rivalry, Mahan maintained, led to a need for sea power.²⁵⁹ He went on to say, “production...shipping...and colonies...---is to be found the key to much of the history, as well as of the policy, of nations bordering upon the sea.”²⁶⁰ From his findings, Mahan drew several conclusions. He held that for countries to be successful they would have to expand their interests to an international scale. Because of this expansion, colonies would be necessary for the country’s security. Continuing this thought, Mahan believed that if the U.S. could not obtain colonies, then some other form of foreign acquisition was needed. This could be rights to coaling stations or repair stations abroad, but no matter what form it took, the U.S. needed to let its presence be known and felt from afar.

Across the U.S., it was generally understood that the frontier land would not last forever. As the end of the 19th century approached, the country came to witness this for itself. The closing of the frontier land that was so coveted by the U.S. represented a new era in its history. On these grounds enters Turner. In his *The Frontier in American History* published in 1893, Turner made the argument that expansion of the frontier land became pivotal to American progress and American character. In his case, he intertwined economic expansion with land expansion and political strength. He states, “so long as free land exists, the opportunity for a competency exists, and economic power secures political power.”²⁶¹ For Turner, a key issue that arose as a result of the closing of the frontier was that of economics. Witnessing the Gilded Age first hand, Turner saw a few get rich quick while a vast majority got poor quicker. Understanding the problems of his time, Turner in an earlier writing wrote, “Today the questions that are uppermost, and

that will become increasingly important are not so much political as economic questions.”²⁶² To elaborate on his opinions, Turner believed that expansion in the form of trade and not that of landed settlement was the solution for the loss of the frontier.²⁶³ Therefore, Turner would oppose the annexation of the Philippines but support implementation of economic expansion. As the ultimate question of Philippine retention was to come a few years after the publication of his work, his ideas played a key role in the United States’ deliberation.

Brooks Adams, the third of the influential thinkers of the time, had a more pessimistic view of the future. Published in 1895, his work *The Law of Civilization and Decay* offered an almost prophetic view as to how society cycles and progresses from “barbarism to civilization.”²⁶⁴ Adams made the argument that there were two forms of energy, fear and greed; and as a society progresses from barbarism to civilization, so too does that society graduate from fear to greed.²⁶⁵ He also made predictions for the fates of societies based on a historical study of failed powers like that of the Roman Empire. In consideration with U.S. foreign relations, Adams believed the country must follow three lines of policy to avoid decay. These were the encouragement of American efficiency through centralization, to gain control of Asia, and to find a man that would lead the country to accomplish the first two tasks. In Adams’ line of thought, if these three things were done properly, the U.S. would attain economic supremacy and have stability at home.²⁶⁶

What kind of control was Adams asking for in Asia? Adams believed, based on examples from Europe that trade with Asia would ultimately lead to decay for civilized societies. To defend his point, Adams cited the creation of the Suez Canal in 1869 and its

effect on the European markets. First, he argued, Asian markets began to provide agricultural competition for Europe as “grain...could be thrown without limit on the European market.”²⁶⁷ But the Suez Canal also enabled those within the Asian markets to obtain modern machinery of the time at a cheap price. Adams states, “The canal made the importation and the reparation of machinery cheap throughout Asia.”²⁶⁸ This is where problems arose and is why economic control of Asia would not be enough in Adams view to sustain a civilized society. In his perspective, civilized societies had had power over those of Asia because of industrialization and the possession of machinery. The machinery gave civilized societies an economic advantage in which Asian societies could not compete. This is why “superiority appeared assured until Orientals should acquire momentum necessary for machinery.”²⁶⁹ This momentum came in the form of the Suez Canal. Accordingly, control of trade with the Asian markets would not stop such markets from receiving cheap machinery, thus producing at cheaper prices. Therefore “intense acceleration of movement by machinery...has destroyed the protection that the costly races long enjoyed against the competition of simpler organisms.”²⁷⁰ In this train of thought lies, the answer of the type of control Adams was asking for in Asia. Economic control of Asia was not enough, as there would be holes in which civilizations could begin to decay as depicted with the example of the Suez Canal. To ensure supremacy for civilized societies, like that of the U.S., Adams was asking for total control of Asia. These thoughts and arguments, being published just three years before the Treaty of Paris was signed, were sure to influence the final decision of Philippine annexation.

Open Door Politics

As the work and writings of these three men were being read and debated throughout the country during the 1890s, global competition in East Asia was heating up. In Europe, those in charge saw the significance of what the East could provide their countries. For this reason England, France, Germany, and Russia were all trying to obtain territory in East Asia. While these countries were carving out their spheres of influence in China during the spring of 1897, domestically, McKinley was taking office. He and his administration did not operate with an immediate sense of urgency in its interests with China because, as Secretary of State John Sherman believed, its partition “would not hurt American markets.”²⁷¹ However, as the U.S. swiftly defeated the Spanish in the Spanish-American War and finalized the Treaty of Paris in the final weeks of 1898, policy towards East Asia changed. The Treaty of Paris handed the Philippines to the U.S., therefore providing a possible stepping-stone to China. This, accompanied by domestic pressures, led to the Open Door Notes. The Notes, the work of Secretary of State John Hay with British help, came in two parts. The first, of 1899, essentially asked the imperial powers who were carving out China to “preserve equality of commercial activity” among the territories in which they claimed stake. These principles were not binding as there was no formal treaty involved and all that was asked of the imperial powers were statements of intent. Along with the Boxer Revolt that took place in Peking, the lack of success of the Open Door Notes of 1899 led to the second Open Door Notes of 1900. These did not ask anything of the imperial powers but instead defined U.S. policy toward China with the main goal being the preservation of China’s territorial integrity.²⁷² The Open Door Notes were essentially a protective measure to ensure U.S. presence in China in light of the course of action taken by the imperial powers during the 1890s.

The largest threat to U.S. aspirations by these European powers was that presented by Russia and Germany. As the U.S. began to indulge itself in the East Asian markets like those of China and Japan, Russia and Germany posed a threat of closing the Open Door. For the U.S., Russia had never meant much. But as the century moved in its last decade, tensions were on the rise. Russia, realizing the value of East Asia, surrendered its territory in North America with the sale of Alaska and began to move all of its focus toward the East.²⁷³ The opportunity for Russia to get a stronghold on East Asia came in the form of a Chinese defeat by the hands of the Japanese. After its humiliating defeat, China was divided into spheres of influence and territory among the European powers and Japan in 1895. In this division, Russia obtained an eighty-year railroad concession that enabled them to construct the Trans-Siberian Railway across Manchuria. Along with this concession, Russia took Port Arthur and Dalien. By doing so, Russia gained control of Manchuria.²⁷⁴ With such immense territorial gains, the U.S. grew more fearful that the Open Door with China would soon shut. John Proctor, a close friend of Roosevelt, in relation to this fear said, “the expansion of Russia in Asia...will extend the Russian system of exclusion.”²⁷⁵ Connect its newly found power in the East with the threat of closing the Open Door and American resentment toward the Pogroms taking place, and tensions between the U.S. and Russia were on the rise.

In addition to the Russian problems for the U.S. came Germany. The 1890s brought about strain between these two countries. The U.S. had now come to view Germany as a nemesis and an eminent threat to East Asian ambitions. German action during the decade may be the reason for this. Their presence in Samoa and penetration into Latin America seem to be the focal points of these actions. However, as the end of

the decade approached and China was being carved into pieces, Germany too found its presence supplanted in the East. In 1897, the Germans seized control of the Harbor of Qingdao, and with that obtained a ninety-nine year lease of the Port City. To add a cherry to the top of their acquisitions, they also received railroad and mining concessions in Shandong.²⁷⁶ The Open Door appeared to be closing on the U.S. and England. The thought of this possibility frightened Americans from an economic standpoint and simply could not happen.

Possibly the most intriguing of all the foreign troubles posed to American and East Asian relations was that of an East Asian country. Japan emulated western powers in its own rise to power. The latter part of the 19th century meant Westernization for the Japanese. Everything from hairstyle to technology to diplomacy was modeled after Western countries. They developed a modern financial system and began to industrialize as part of their Westernization. Politically, in 1889 the Japanese imposed a constitution that housed a bicameral parliament.²⁷⁷ With Westernization came success. Japan handily disposed of China in their dispute over Korea and imposed an unfair treaty upon them in 1894-95 demanding the independence of Korea along with a huge indemnity and four new ports. Japanese success did not go unrecognized and because their success was inspired by Westernization, countries like the U.S. could not help but to take notice. Theodore Roosevelt was an American who took notice of Japanese success and admired them militarily and politically. He predicted, "I believe Japan will take its place as a great civilized power of the formidable type."²⁷⁸ Admiration aside, the truth of the matter was that Japan was becoming quite powerful in the East and posed a threat to America's influence and trade in East Asia.

While foreign powers carved out territories and spheres of influence in East Asia, as previously stated, the United States was winning a war against Spain. After defeating Spain in both Cuba and the Philippines, the U.S. successfully won its, as dubbed by John Hay, “Splendid Little War.”²⁷⁹ With the U.S. victory, came the provisions of the Treaty of Paris. This entailed that Spain give up all rights to Cuba, surrender Puerto Rico and its possessions in the West Indies, surrender Guam to the U.S., and lastly surrender the Philippines to the U.S. for a payment of \$20 million. Now that the U.S. had the Philippines in its possession, the answers as to what to do with the islands gradually fell into place.

One sure solution as stated by McKinley in his foundation for retention was “that we could not give them back to Spain—that would be cowardly and dishonorable.”²⁸⁰ This rationale is where foreign strategy comes into play. The U.S. grew to despise the Spanish. With Spanish action abroad like, as General Elwell Otis cabled to Washington January 14, 1898, “Spaniards still inciting insurgents, misrepresenting the intention of United States in order to defeat ratification of the treaty,” handing the archipelago back to Spain was not an option.²⁸¹ Not only was it poor from a strategic standpoint to hand the Philippines back to Spain, but the U.S. also looked down on Spain at a simple human level. Evidence of this can be found in a report of the Philippine Commission to the president where Spanish are generalized to be “full of honor without honesty, full of religion without morality, and full of pride without anything to be proud of.”²⁸²

Also out of the question for the archipelago’s fate was the possibility of being obtained by any other imperial power. McKinley also told the members of the Methodist missionary society, “that we could not turn them over to France or Germany—that would

be bad business and discreditable.”²⁸³ Although only mentioning France and Germany, McKinley was making reference to all foreign imperial powers because of the competition they had already created in the East. Russia and Germany were out of the picture to receive any portion of the archipelago after each country gained lengthy and extensive railroad concessions in China along with control of several of its harbors. The coercion of these two countries combining forces led the U.S. and Britain to fear the Open Door closing. As for Japan who was permanently situated in the East, they were not to be given any part of the Philippines either. Japan in the 1890s had proven itself a worthy nemesis to any that stood in its way after bullying China in the middle of the decade. With its global position in the midst of the East Asian markets, obtaining the Philippines would possibly hand Japan economic supremacy and total control of the East. If there were any threat to the Open Door closing, this would be one of the top contenders.

Handing the Philippines to another power would also be, in the words of McKinley, “discreditable.” After defeating the Spanish, the country had found something positive to unite the population after the troubles of the 1890s. The war gave the U.S. an opportunity to prove itself on the world stage and did so with the ease of its victory. The last thing the U.S. wanted to do at that point was to tarnish its newly attained respect. Because of this, the U.S. could not give away the Philippines. To maintain its position in the world and prove it was among equals with the other worldly powers, the U.S. had to take full responsibility for its spoils of war. Senator Lodge iterated this point in his speech to Congress regarding Philippine retention:

I hope we have too much self-respect to hand them over to European Powers with the confession that they can restore peace and order more kindly and justly than we, and lead the inhabitants onward to a larger

liberty and a more complete self-government than we can bestow upon them.²⁸⁴

These arguments, along with fear of the Open Door closing, proved to be too powerful to ignore. The forces that came to form from U.S. foreign strategy urging Philippine retention far outweighed any arguments that the anti-imperialists could construct in its opposition.

“White Man’s Burden”

Racism throughout the U.S. during the 1890s was not unusual, in fact, it was common. The abolition of slavery did not equate to equality for those newly freed African Americans. Sharecropping was a way for former slaveholders to remain in power of their former slaves. In this practice, the workers would use a plot of land and equipment provided by the landowner to produce crops. Each year those workers were to give a percentage of their crop to the landowner in return for the land. This procedure, like that of model towns, left the workers in debt to the landowners. It was processes like these, along with segregation laws and post-war Southern resentment fueled the extreme racism that continued through the end of the nineteenth century.

African Americans were not the only group looked down upon by “civilized” white Anglo-Saxons. Just about any racial group other than white could fill the place of an African American. Because of this, racism was also a key force that drove Philippine annexation. The Filipinos were viewed as an inferior race; therefore, even though they began to establish a government under rule of the Filipino insurgents after being relinquished from Spain, they could not be left to their own devices as McKinley explained, “we could not leave them to themselves—they were unfit for government.”²⁸⁵ McKinley drew this conclusion from his own prejudices and from what he was hearing

from those in the Philippines witnessing firsthand the state of the archipelago. A cable from General Otis to Washington in January of 1898 provides an example of McKinley's understanding of the situation in the Philippines. Otis informs:

Murders and robbery outside the city frequently show inefficiency of insurgent government to restrain people. More intelligent members of that government admit their dependence on United States assistance.²⁸⁶

Essentially, the racism that was so fervent throughout the U.S. began to morph itself into a sense of duty. In shambles after the war, the direction of this sense of duty was to help get the Philippine archipelago on its feet and become civilized for as McKinley concluded:

There was nothing left for us to do but to take them...and to educate the Filipinos, and uplift and civilize and Christianize them and by God's grace do the very best we could by them.²⁸⁷

The U.S. held the belief that they were doing what was best for the Filipinos because it was their duty as a superior society and race to do so. Without pondering what the Filipinos thought was best for them, or acknowledging their requests, the U.S. embarked on civilizing the Filipinos and with the aim of constructing a society that would thrive. The original motives that the U.S. had held in regard to helping the Filipino people can be understood through a cable from McKinley to generals in Manila on January 8, 1899:

We accepted the Philippines from high duty in the interests of their inhabitants and for humanity and civilization. Our sacrifices were with this high motive. We want to improve the condition of the inhabitants, securing them peace, liberty, and the pursuit of their highest good.²⁸⁸

Interestingly enough, it was the same racist ideals that fueled the anti-imperialistic charge against annexation of the archipelago. For anti-imperialists, like former Senator from Missouri, Carl Schurz, the Filipinos represented a "large mass of more or less barbarous Asiatics."²⁸⁹ The anti-imperialist argument against annexation was that it

would allow the Filipinos to enter America and add cheap competition for labor to the already large amounts of the population who were struggling for work. Not only would it create problems from that aspect but it would also violate “Schurz’s Law.” This held that annexation would violate the Constitution by ignoring the consent of the governed, or corrupt the homogeneity of the nation, which was pivotal to maintained constitutional operation.²⁹⁰

Unfortunately, for the anti-imperialists, their arguments were silenced with a poem by Rudyard Kipling. The *White Man’s Burden* became the rallying cry for imperialists throughout the U.S. In his poem, Kipling laid the framework in which the U.S. should follow as a civilized nation in regards to the handling of the Philippines. Kipling asked the U.S. to “Take up the White Man’s burden” by guiding “Your new-caught, sullen peoples, Half-devil and half-child.”²⁹¹

In order for racism itself to generate enough pressure in favor of Philippine retention, it had to change its frame. In its purest form, racism led the U.S. to view the Filipinos as an inferior race. This sense was also felt by the anti-imperialists thus fueling their arguments. Because of this, the force of racism was not enough to invoke annexation. But as it morphed into a sense of duty, that racism then compelled the country to feel responsible for the guidance and ultimate well-being of the Filipinos. Duty then eventually matured with Christian aspects into destiny and the full picture for imperialists could be realized as portrayed by famed General Arthur MacArthur:

When the Filipino people realize the grandeur of their future destiny by reason of association with the great Republic, and come to understand that they are a chosen people to carry not only American commerce but also republican institutions and the principles of the personal liberty throughout Asia, they may be relied upon to rally to the inspiring thoughts thus suggested and follow and support the American flag in whatever contests

the future may have in store for it as a symbol of human liberty throughout the world.²⁹²

Conclusion

Rising in the last decade of the nineteenth century were three powerful forces. The first, economic recovery, gained momentum as the Gilded Age was curtailed by a devastating economic depression in 1893 that spiked unemployment. Economic recovery was to be sustained not from an internal source but from increased trade with foreign markets. The forces of economic recovery pointed to East Asian markets to resolve the economic crises of the 1890s U.S. The second force engendered itself in the form of foreign strategy. As a result of the need for a presence in East Asian markets to sustain itself economically, the force of foreign strategy compelled the U.S. to act in such a manner to preserve the Open Door with China. This force was binding as foreign imperial powers carved out spheres of influence with China thus threatening the Open Door. Add the influence of the writings of Mahan, Turner, and Adams, and foreign strategy became more prevalent than ever before. The third and most pernicious force of the decade was racism. Fostering tensions from the memory of the Civil War, the 1890s cultivated extreme racism with beliefs that all races other than white Anglo-Saxons were inferior and were to be treated accordingly.

With the Spanish-American War, all three forces were to unite and compel a decision that permanently changed U.S. foreign policy. The war that was fought in 1898 was the means by which the U.S. population would come together and find hope in a decade that had been mangled with crises. By the end of the year, the Spanish ceded the Philippine archipelago to the U.S. thus leaving the victor with an important decision. The decision was in relation to what to do with the Philippines. Should the country break

from its isolationist ways or should it join the elite group of imperial powers? Despite staunch opposition from the anti-imperialists, the forces that were generated by the decade were too commanding to ignore. Retention of the Philippines was the answer that these converging forces longed for. The Philippines provided a stepping-stone to the “illimitable markets” of East Asia along with a new source of cheap labor and natural resources thus settling the issues brought up with economic recovery. Also, with a stepping-stone to the East Asian markets, the U.S. could successfully prevent the Open Door to China from closing, therefore answering the calls that had been made by the forces of foreign strategy. Finally, the archipelago responded to the forces of racism. Because white, “civilized” societies thought themselves to be superior to others, the Philippine islands gave the U.S. an opportunity to prove this superiority by helping develop and establish the Philippines as a civilized nation.

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“Or Does it Explode”; Collective Rage and Domestic Terror

By: Brooks Mason

As a society, we have been told that political and social change only comes through the ballot and political violence is unacceptable; in the majority of cases, this is true however, when the government fails to protect its citizen's violence unfortunately becomes a necessary evil. Such a failure occurred in the wake of World War One with the resurgence of the Ku Klux Klan. As the Klan's reign of terror spread throughout the United States, it was confronted by both violent and nonviolent acts of resistance. While nonviolence undoubtedly played a role in impeding the growth of the KKK, it eventually proved incapable of halting its cancerous spread. Violent resistance however was in many cases able to check and even reverse the growth of the Klan. Nonviolence failed because, in many cases, the community shared the Klan's bigotry, rendering attempts at publicly shaming and using the criminal justice system ineffective. Violence, on the other hand, succeeded. Anti-Klan riots drove recruitment underground and made Klan membership less appealing. The group was effectively barred from violence-prone areas.

As Reconstruction waned towards the end of the 19th century so did the Ku Klux Klan, however, it experienced a revival shortly after WWI. Historians have identified four key events as the reason for the Ku Klux Klan's resurrection: the murder of Mary Phagan and the subsequent lynching of Leo Frank, D.W. Griffith's *Birth of a Nation* and its glowing endorsement of the Klan and finally the revival meeting on Stone Mountain Georgia. All four of these events undoubtedly played a role in the organization's revival, but they also are symptomatic of a struggling post war economy and the changing religious and racial makeup of the United States. In the wake of World War One recent

immigrants ultimately grew to compromise 20% of the total population.²⁹³ The Second KKK also claimed a more diverse list of enemies than their original incarnation. The Klan itself claimed that its enemies were

“Every criminal, every gambler, every thug, every libertine, every girl ruiner[sic], every home wrecker, every wife beater, every dope peddler, every moonshiner, every crooked politician, every pagan papist priest, every shyster lawyer, every K. of C[Knights of Columbus]. Every white slaver, every brothel madam, every Rome-controlled newspaper, every black spider”²⁹⁴

The second Ku Klux Klan not only had a different list of enemies but different strategies for attaining their goals. The tactics of the first Klan relied almost entirely upon the lash and the noose the second Klan also added the ballot box and the printing press to its arsenal. The Klan became so successful in politics in some states that the bulk of politicians were either Klansmen themselves or was widely acknowledged as being Klan puppets. One of the more well known of these puppet governors was Ed Jackson of Indiana who the Grand Dragon of Indiana referred to as “the incompetent he put in the statehouse.”²⁹⁵

As the second Klan became more involved in politics, it forced many people who objected to the KKK’s noxious ideology to mount anti-Klan campaigns. These campaigns shared many similarities and a general anti-Klan platform consisted of laws banning the wearing of masks in public by adults, anti-temperance laws, the firing of Klan-affiliated appointees and support for parochial schools. Anti-Klan political agitation sprung up in any state where the Klan had a political presence. One of the most well

known of these campaigners was the Kansas gubernatorial candidacy of William White. White did not believe he had any chance of winning; his goal was instead to act as a spoiler candidate in order to keep a pro-Klan Republican out of the governor's mansion²⁹⁶ and "spit in the face of the Klan."²⁹⁷ While White's campaign incorporated the standard anti-Klan series of reforms, it also possessed its own unique populist tone. White's attacks hinged on the fact that both the Republican Ben Paulen and his Democratic opponent were Klan candidates and by painting the Klan as an absurd institution. White saved the bulk of his venom for his fellow Republican by describing his nomination as "a flock of dragons, kleagles, cyclopes [sic] and fuzzy furies came to Wichita... and held a meeting with ...some terrors and whambedoodles [sic]. They selected Ben Paulen to run as Republican candidate of the Ku Klux Klan".²⁹⁸ While White's speech seems to be awash in nonsense words, he was in fact making fun of the very real Klan official titles of Grand Dragon and Imperial Wizard.

When anti- Klan politicians were elected and were able to enact laws that restricted Klan activity they had the potential to infringe on the rights of the community as a whole. Politically engaging the Klan also provided a platform for Klan propaganda and the organization also proved it was willing to change its name in order to skirt the law. The law in general is an ineffective tool in dealing with the Klan because the organization has no respect for the rule of law. The United States House of Representatives called for the Klan to be questioned on the floor of the House. The members of the House intended to use this questioning period to humiliate the Klan and draw attention to its acts of barbarism. Unfortunately, the statesmen's plan backfired and provided the Klan with a platform to broadcast its bigoted point of view. In the words of

the Klan Grand Wizard it provided the organization with “a vast amount of gratuitous [sic] and inviable [sic] advertising”.²⁹⁹ In 1923 in New York, the legislature passed the Walker Bill, which at the time was known as the nation’s most restrictive anti-Klan law. The law required all unincorporated oath-bound organizations provide a list of its members, constitution, oaths, bylaws and rules with the secretary of state.³⁰⁰ While the law did not specifically name the Klan, it was clear that it targeted the organization. In order to get around this legislation and slip beneath the radar the organization changed their name to Alpha Pi Sigma.³⁰¹

Political action also required a consensus among the local community that the Klan was a serious problem and that consensus had to spread over a much larger area than that required for a riot. The Democratic political machine in Delaware stumbled into just such a bureaucratic quagmire at their state convention in 1924. The delegates from the industrial centers of the state such as Wilmington called for a resolution condemning the Klan by name. The resolution quickly bogged down in the face of opposition from representatives from the more rural counties such as Kent and Sussex. The bureaucratic impasse proved so crippling that the resolution collapsed. The collapse of this resolution divided the Democratic Party in Delaware and undoubtedly contributed to the party’s defeat in the coming presidential election. This legislative disaster discouraged other parties in other states from even discussing the Klan issue.

Newspaper articles were also used to confront the Klan and they typically came in the form of editorials. These editorials can be further broken down into two categories, those advocating violence and those condemning the Klan. There was a series of editorials in the *World Tomorrow*, a paper with a rather liberal and Unitarian bent. *The*

World Tomorrow articles advocated a pacifist stance and made the case for them to be ignored and that they would eventually wear themselves out. In one of these editorials titled, “How Shall We Meet the Klan?” the author states “We shall not meet it at all in the sense of debate or discussion or recrimination. The Klan is the outcome of prejudice and bitter experience has taught us that it is impossible to meet prejudice with logic.”³⁰² The article also specifically cautions African Americans to “not attempt to organize against the Klan”³⁰³ and instead encourages them to mock the organization. Another article in the *World Tomorrow* by William White entitled *Patience and Publicity* made a similar case calling for strictly nonviolent action. White encourages this course of action by stating that “If they are by force coercion, [sic] nothing will happen except a row”.

While the printing of anti-Klan articles was necessary in order to build a network of people willing to respond in kind to Klan attacks they did little to directly interfere with Klan activities. The polite rapprochements of pacifist intellectuals also brought little comfort to the victims of night riding who were often left bloodied and bruised. Newspaper articles that counseled non-violence also had the potential of discouraging people from joining the anti-Klan movement. The advocacy of non-violence by many in the anti-Klan movement had the potential to discourage supporters because it portrayed the organization as unfeeling and impotent. Articles that advocated self-defense on the other hand not only provided advice on how to challenge the Klan but also showed that the movement as a whole cared for and was willing to take an active role in defending their allies. The minutes of several Klan meetings even betrayed their fear of their victims allying and arming themselves. A Klavern in Oregon voiced just such a fear to its members when it closed a meeting by reminding its members that “all good K.C. carry

a .38 automatic when they go out at night. Be careful, Klansmen”.³⁰⁴ (K.C. refers to the Knights of Columbus.) There were, however, no references to Klansmen fearing the publication of hostile news articles.

There were also publications that publicized Klan membership lists in an attempt to strip away the mystery of the organization that many initiates found so seductive. Some of the more common ways of obtaining these lists were to place a mole inside the organization or for reporters to get their hands on hotel ledgers when there were suspected Klan gatherings in the area. William White published just such a list in his Emporia, Kansas newspaper. In order to get this list he sent a reporter to obtain a copy of the hotel guest registry. The manager of the Broadview Hotel unsurprisingly refused to turn over the registry.³⁰⁵ White in turn threatened to never mention the hotel in his paper again except in the case of police raids or other unflattering instances the hotel soon caved under this pressure and handed over the ledger.³⁰⁶ The publication of the ledger and other membership lists not only made Klansmen vulnerable to potential legal investigation but also many risked losing their jobs, having their businesses boycotted and being ostracized from the community. One of the more comical instances of the consequences of being outed as a Klansmen was when a local Catholic mailman refused to deliver the mail of a local Klan chapter in Oregon and the organization was forced to change its mailing address to a PO Box.³⁰⁷

While publishing membership lists could potentially expose Klansmen to community justice, it required a significant portion of the local population to disapprove of their actions. The publishing of membership lists also could and often did lead to innocent people being accused of Klan membership. The prominent chewing gum

distributor William Wrigley was just one such innocent person swept up in the anti-Klan hysteria. In 1923 the well-meaning American Unity League (AUL) published a monthly pamphlet entitled “Who’s Who in Nightgowns” designed to reveal the identity of suspected Klansmen. In the course of publishing the pamphlet the AUL managed to get a hold of a Klan membership list, little did the AUL know that the Klan had counted on this and had allowed them to steal a forged membership list with the names of several celebrities including William Wrigley. When to Wrigley’s surprise his name appeared in an AUL pamphlet he sued the organization for libel for the amount of \$50,000.³⁰⁸ The Wrigley debacle ruined the reputation of the AUL and drastically cut the organization’s operational budget.

When economic means, such as boycotts and the firing of known Klan members, were used as tools to punish the organization their effect was extremely limited. The main drawback to applying economic pressure to the Klan was that in many cases the Klan had created its own community that it could fall back on for support and employment. Another drawback to relying on economic pressure was the Klan's ability to infiltrate what had once been non-Klan businesses. The Klan was able to revive a grocery store in Oregon that had been forced into foreclosure due to a combination of poor planning and a partial boycott. The KKK was able to resurrect the business of fellow Klansmen Gar Holm by requiring all members of their local chapter to purchase their groceries from him.³⁰⁹ The Klan’s political power also created employment opportunities for its members by favoring them for government contracts and for careers in local government. The same Klan chapter that rescued the Holm grocery store also was able to infiltrate and eventually force out the proprietor of Herman’s Lunch Counter,

which had been previously owned by a German Catholic immigrant.³¹⁰ The Klan also practiced boycotts of its own in an attempt to keep “Klansmen’s money in Klansmen’s pockets.”³¹¹ Local Klaverns would make a list of businesses that were somewhat less than 100% American and forbid their members to patronize these businesses. If a Klansmen were to be caught patronizing such an establishment he could find himself banished from the organization.³¹²

Anti-Klan propaganda was another weapon leveled at the Klan on a regular basis. Propaganda was one of the more diverse forms of resistance. Some of the more common forms of propaganda were false flag actions and anti-Klan speeches. False flag actions refer to the commission of an utterly reprehensible act that is blamed on one's enemies in hopes that the enraged local populace will turn on these enemies. One, of the more well-known organizations to employ this tactic, was the Ladies of the Invisible Empire (LOTIE) who were an unofficial female Klan auxiliary. The L.O.T.I.E.s were once closely allied to the Klan; however, this changed as their subservient status became clearer and interpersonal conflicts began to grow between members of both groups. The most graphic incidents occurred when a member of the LOTIES claimed that a group of Klansmen had come to her house in the middle of the night and branded her on the breast with the image of a cross.³¹³ This attack was likely motivated by the fact that the alleged victim had been incarcerated because of a violation of prohibition. While this may seem like an innocuous or trivial event, it represented a double standard between the KKK and L.O.T.I.E.’s. This double standard was characterized by the fact that had she been a Klansmen she probably would not have been charged. Unlike more successful incidents a grand jury refused to issue an indictment.³¹⁴ Drawing the Klan into a protracted legal

battle had both the potential to humiliate and lockup a few Klansmen. It however lowered the credibility of the movement as a whole and made both juries and the general population far less willing to believe legitimate claims of abuse at the hands of the Klan.

Lawsuits were also used both to limit the voice of the Ku Klux Klan and to financially undermine the organization. The Knights of Columbus with the backing of the Catholic Church were the primary instigators of these cases. These lawsuits were primarily concerned with testing the constitutionality of laws that they believed unfairly targeted the Catholic community and to punish those who spread anti-Catholic propaganda. The Knights of Columbus challenged the constitutionality of an Oregon law that required all children to attend public schools. The Catholic community felt that this law was designed to shut down their religious schools and took this claim all the way to the Supreme Court. During the course of this protracted legal battle, the Knights of Columbus were forced to spend approximately \$96,000 dollars on legal fees.³¹⁵ The Knights of Columbus also brought a libel suit against a Klan-backed publishing house, The Rail Splitter, who earned the wrath of the Catholic community by the publication of a bogus Knights of Columbus oath, which among other things claimed that all members of the Knights of Columbus were sworn to flay and bury alive all non-Catholics upon the Pope's command. While the Knights of Columbus and the Catholic Church were successful in stopping the Rail Splitter from printing some of its more virulent propaganda it did nothing to stop the spread of such lies and propaganda by word of mouth.³¹⁶ Suing the Klan and sympathetic publishers for libel also created a dangerous precedent of limiting free speech. The prosecution of libel lawsuits can prove particularly hazardous in a society where the principle of free speech is an enshrined

value and can quickly in the eyes of the public turn the aggrieved party into the aggressor. Libel lawsuits are also notoriously difficult and expensive to prosecute.

While civil law suits proved to be a minefield of shifting public opinion and legal jargon criminal prosecution proved to be one of the few viable means of prosecuting Klansmen. The trial of the “The Old Man of Indiana”³¹⁷ was one of the few successful prosecutions of Klan members. On a spring night in 1925, David Stephenson an Indiana Klan leader invited a local woman by the name of Madge Oberholtzer to join him in his private train car. Upon Oberholtzer’s arrival, Evans forced her to drink against her will and took her to Chicago. While on the train to Chicago Stephenson sexually assaulted and bit Madge so severely that he ripped large chunks of flesh from her body. In order to escape from this nightmare, Madge went to a drugstore near one of the train stops under the pretext of buying a hat and instead purchased several mercurial chloride tablets. Madge used these tablets to poison herself in hopes that her abductor would be forced to take her to a hospital. In an attempt to cover, his tracks Stephenson demanded that Madge marry him in exchange for being taken to the hospital, where she could escape from her abductors. When she refused his marital overtures he had one of his bodyguards unceremoniously drop her off at her home where she began to vomit blood and shortly there after died. Before Madge died, she gave an account of her harrowing escape and due to the horrific nature of the crime; the district attorney was forced to file charges. Throughout the course of his trial, Stephenson believed that his political allies whom he had helped put into office would save him. As the trial continued and it became clear that no help was forthcoming, Stephenson threatened to release the contents of his black box, which held embarrassing personal secrets of state politicians. The horrifying nature of

his crime put them in a precarious position. If they helped Stephenson, they would be committing political suicide and if they did not their deepest darkest secrets would become public knowledge. After his conviction and sentencing to life imprisonment. Klan membership steeply declined and Klansmen burned their robes and denied their membership. While this effort at litigation proved successful, on the whole it was unreliable because of the large number of Klan-affiliated judges and jurors. The only reason these litigation efforts succeeded, where others failed, was because of the horrific nature of Stephenson's crime and his own bungling efforts at covering it up.³¹⁸ The legal system could be used in response to violence but it offered little comfort to the Klan's victims. Violent means of resistance, however, could be used to prevent these acts.

While nonviolent resistance played a role in maintaining order and limiting Klan activity. Violence was far more successful at controlling the Klan and was in some cases able to not only intimidate the Klan into silence and passivity but to banish it from entire regions. It is also important to keep in mind that even in areas where the KKK had been banished they remained racially and ethnically divided areas. Although these areas were far from our modern era of relative racial equality they represented a future of the United States, where varying and diverse groups of both men women could stand together and resist an organization that stood for unfettered bigotry, ignorance, and hypocrisy.

As the Klan became more widespread, it came into contact with people who were just as willing and capable of using violence, and when these groups crossed paths violence typically ensued. One such interaction occurred in Brookefield, Massachusetts, after a KKK induction or naturalization ceremony. After the ceremony finished and the participants were on their way home, they were ambushed by a mob of rock-throwing

local residents despite efforts by state troopers to separate the groups.³¹⁹ Another similar riot took place in Lancaster, Pennsylvania, where two hundred Klansmen were besieged for approximately nine hours and had to be rescued by a contingent of state police³²⁰. Riots like those at Brookefield and Lancaster were so common that it became virtually impossible for them to have a gathering of any size without instigating a riot. This sort of violence undoubtedly scared away potential recruits from the organization. This atmosphere of constant confrontation forced the organization to focus their day-to-day efforts on security instead of intimidating and attacking minority communities. In places where the Klan was not aggressively confronted such as Texas, it had the potential to act out violently.

Riots or other similar acts of violence were such effective tools that, even the threat of a riot was enough to intimidate the Klan. In 1923 in Scottsdale, Pennsylvania, the Keystone Klansmen was confronted by a rising tide of resentment. The high point of anti-Klan violence came during a parade in Carnegie, Pennsylvania, which was met by a shower of bricks and crumbling masonry and also by a volley of pistol fire that killed a young Klansmen by the name of Tom Abbott on the spot.³²¹ In an effort to salvage their tarnished reputation in Pennsylvania, the Klan planned a show of force in Scottsdale. The KKK planned to flex its muscle by parading in Klan garb in front of the local Catholic Church. This proved too much for the local Catholic community to endure, and they swore that no masked Klansmen would get past Pittsburgh Street alive and began to stockpile arms. The Klan responded by promising that if violence broke out that by sunrise there wouldn't be a Catholic left alive in Scottsdale. When the Klan's bluster failed to intimidate their rivals, the Exalted Cyclops of Scottsdale refused to march.

While the Scottsdale Klan backed down the other visiting Klaverns could not be intimidated and a compromise was finally reached when in exchange for a much needed police escort, the marchers agreed to remove their hoods.³²²

The Indiana Klan was forced to submit to a similarly humiliating truce in the city of South Bend, Indiana. When the Klan arrived in the city, they did so without any real planning or organization and this left them vulnerable to ambush. They were greeted upon their arrival by a contingent of students from Notre Dame who introduced themselves as fellow Klansmen and pledged to take them to the meeting place, but instead they led them into a blind alley, beat them, took their robes and clothes, and then dumped them naked in the center of town.³²³ The South Bend riots, unlike the actions taken by their nonviolent allies, were able to force the Klan to the negotiating table and wring humiliating concessions from the organization. The Klan was forced to agree to a truce wherein they foreswore the wearing of masks in public, and the students promised not to beat and strip the Klansmen of their robes. Without their masks, the Klansmen were incapable of performing their more violent acts and the organization was effectively neutered. The agreement between these two groups was seen as a sign of weakness for the Klan and provided encouragement to its enemies³²⁴ and victims alike. The lack of anonymity in South Bend made it “a persistent weak spot in the kluxing [sic] of Indiana”³²⁵.

In 1922, the Ku Klux Klan had been gaining strength in Delaware, particularly around Laurel. As the Klan began to move into port cities such as New Castle, the organization came into conflict with the local Catholic Church. This conflict came to a head in New Castle in a field on the edge of town. The Klan would frequently attempt to

intimidate the Catholic community into passivity by holding “Naturalization” and cross-burning ceremonies near the city. In the summer of that year, tensions finally boiled over and at one of these “Naturalization” ceremonies, a crowd of local Catholics gathered on the outskirts of the ceremony. In anticipation of a possible attack on their meeting, the Klan had stationed guards in order to keep the crowd of protestors back. The Klan was able to contain the crowd until the conclusion of the ceremony and the lighting of a giant wooden cross. When the cross was finally lit, a roar of “to hell with the Klan”³²⁶ and “Hurrah for the Irish”³²⁷ went up and the crowd surged forward. The previously swaggering Klansmen were forced to flee for their lives, and as the battle spread, bands of rioters descended upon the town overturning and burning the cars of suspected Klansmen. The riot left three men dead and over fifty injured. The Klan’s image was so sullied and its members so cowed that they were forced to retreat from the majority of urban centers.³²⁸

The KKK of Maine was also forced into a humbling retreat when it confronted the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) in the town of Greenville, Maine. The IWW had moved into the area in an attempt to unionize the local lumberjacks. The IWW had earned the ire of the Ku Klux Klan due to its leftist political views. The loggers were predominantly French Catholic immigrants from Quebec. The threat of an alliance between these two groups formed a nightmare scenario for the Klan and drew them into the conflict. In an early attempt to intimidate the two organizations, the Klan arrived in force at the local boarding house and threatened that if the IWW organizers did not leave town they would be evicted. In response to the Klan’s threats a horde of lumberjacks arrived on the scene in an attempted show of force. While the loggers never resorted to

violence, the mere threat of a potential attack convinced the Klan that any attack on the IWW would result in disaster and no further threats were made against the IWW.³²⁹

The Klan received a particularly chilly reception in Baltimore in 1922 when a Klan backed ex-nun gave a speech at a Protestant church denouncing the alleged sexual deviancy of the Catholic clergy. The speech not only drew potential Klan recruits but also the local Catholic community who had grown tired of the Klan's slanderous attacks. As the mob began to grow, they attacked the church, which was only saved from being burned down by the timely retreat of the Klan and its supporters.³³⁰ In order to save face and cover up for its failure to thrive in Maryland, the Grand Dragon Frank Beal claimed that his chapter had approximately 33,000 members. It became apparent that Beal had grossly overstated his organization's strength. Instead of the disciplined army he proclaimed to have, he instead presided over a chaotic organization made up of a combination of fair-weather supporters and local ruffians.³³¹ Beal's Klan, like nearly every other Klan that ran into determined physical opposition, rapidly deflated and slowly petered out.

Rioters also held the advantage of being nearly impervious to both legal and physical retaliation. This advantage grew primarily out of the larger numbers of people involved and the tacit police support that typically accompanied these acts. The Klan in general avoided retaliation against individuals because this would have brought not only the unwanted attention of the police but also potentially the martial law conditions that crushed the first Klan. The Klan also avoided retaliating against the organizations that typically backed these riots because when the Klan was confronted en masse, it typically lost badly.

Tacit police protection was particularly evident in the wake of several riots in and around Brookfield, Massachusetts. During and after the majority of these riots, the police either refused to arrest anti-Klan rioters or after they were arrested quietly turned them loose due to lack of evidence. In Brookfield for example, several hundred protestors clashed with around 1500 Klansmen and only 75 people were arrested, and of those only 15 were held for trial.³³² During another riot near Berlin, Massachusetts, the Klan held a rally in a field on the outskirts of town. Approximately 300 Klansmen and an unreported number of protestors attended this rally. Klan meetings, particularly those in Massachusetts, typically ended in violence. The local police pledged to send a group of policemen to protect the Klan rally. While the police technically held up their end of the bargain, they only sent one man to control a meeting of over 300. When the inevitable riot broke out, it was only broken up by the arrival of several Massachusetts state troopers. When the troopers arrived on the scene, instead of breaking up the riot the State Police attacked the Klansmen and cooperated with the rioters.³³³

Confronting the Klan via nonviolent means also posed a particular danger to those utilizing it because while the populace as a whole held a strong aversion to the use of violence, the Klan held no such sentiments. A teacher who refused to allow her student to read an essay extolling the virtues of the KKK soon found herself the subject of threats and the refrain that if she didn't like it here she should go back where she came from³³⁴. A Baptist Minister in Birmingham, Alabama, also felt the wrath of the Ku Klux Klan when, after publishing a series of pamphlets condemning the organization, he was confronted by a squadron of Klansmen. When they arrived at his office they forced their

way in and told them that if, he did not cease publishing such materials he would be killed.³³⁵

The Ku Klux Klan holds the dubious distinction of being one of the most virulent terrorist organizations in history. The actions of the Klan however did not go unopposed; they were in fact met with every form of resistance possible from the mild rebuke of the editorial page to a shower of bricks. While nonviolent actions such as lawsuits and anti-Klan political campaigns impeded the progress of the Ku Klux Klan, their effectiveness paled in comparison to that of more violent acts such as riots. Non-violence also offered little comfort or assistance to people who were dragged from their homes and flogged in the middle of the night. The failure of non- violence can largely be traced to the nature of the people who joined the Klan. It remains beyond contestation that someone who could beat his countrymen to death simply for the color of his skin or the religious creed he adheres to is unlikely to be swayed by financial inducements or being ostracized from the community.

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The Media and Public Opinion During the Vietnam War

By: Lauren Brown

Introduction

The media has been transmitting its influences on our society for decades. Through magazines, pictures, newscasts, and newspapers, the media has the power to manipulate the minds of Americans. A time that the media played a pivotal role in impacting American society was during the Vietnam War era. Also known as the “television war,” this was the first war that was televised, and this allowed people to see the horrors of war in their living room. Public opinion fluctuated throughout the Vietnam War era with many Americans taking an oppositional stance by 1969. This leads us to ask the question: Did the media coverage of the war influence American citizens to take on anti-war views? Claims that the media took an oppositional stance after 1968 suggest it was a leading catalyst in expanding the anti-war movement. From pictures, television shows, coverage of protests, and newscasts the media showed the world how horrific war really is. Whether the media influenced American citizens to take an oppositional stance toward the Vietnam War or not, it played a large role in shaping American culture during that time.

Brief Vietnam History

The French had occupied Vietnam until 1954. Following the French defeat by Vietnamese nationalists, it was decided at the Geneva Peace Conference that Vietnam was to be divided at the 17th parallel into the independent North and the United States supported south until reunification and elections in 1956. Ngo Dinh Diem was elected President in South Vietnam, while communist Ho Chi Minh was the leader in North

Vietnam. Tensions began to arise in Vietnam when President Ngo Dinh Diem decided that elections were not to be held, fearing that communist Ho Chi Minh would be elected; America had supported Diem's decision.³³⁶

In the United States, McCarthyism was in full effect and Americans were fearful of the spread of communism. In 1956, President Dwight D. Eisenhower sent military advisors into South Vietnam. With North Vietnam backed by the Soviet Union and China, which were both communist, the United States wanted to prevent the spread of communism, which they called the "domino theory." The "domino theory" stated if one country fell to communism, eventually all countries would fall to communism, like dominoes. President Eisenhower believed that with the aid of the United States, South Vietnam could resist communism.³³⁷

John F. Kennedy took office in 1961. During his term, he increased the amount of aid being sent, and increased the amount of military advisors in Vietnam to about sixteen thousand. In 1963, President Diem was assassinated in a coup d'etat, and three months later in November, President Kennedy was assassinated. It was during Lyndon B. Johnson's presidency that involvement in Vietnam substantially escalated.³³⁸

On August 2, 1964, the U.S.S Maddox was fired upon by three North Vietnamese vessels. Two nights later, on August 4, there was another alleged attack in the Gulf of Tonkin. However, the second attack is more controversial as it may have been the rough waters that set the sonar system off signaling a possible attack. President Johnson took immediate action and on August 7, 1964, the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was passed allowing President Johnson to use military force without the formal declaration of war from Congress. In March 1965, 3,500 United States Marines were deployed, and by

December, the number of Marines deployed increased to 200,000. American involvement in Vietnam had escalated dramatically.³³⁹

Heading Into War and Public Opinion

After the Gulf of Tonkin incident, American citizens had supported President Johnson's decision to send more troops into Vietnam. Figure 1 shows a graph by Gartner, Segura, and Wilkening that demonstrates the percentage of approval for the administration's handling of the war. In October 1965, 78.1% of American's approved. Shown in Figure 2 is a picture from the Lyndon B. Johnson Library and Museum, which shows Johnson addressing a crowd in July of 1966 in Indianapolis, Indiana. The crowd below him is holding American flags and there is a giant banner that states "Back LBJ in Vietnam." This shows how supportive the American citizens were at the onset of the war.³⁴⁰

By 1968, the American victory in Vietnam seemed much further out of reach than expected. On January 31, 1968, North and South Vietnam announced a cease-fire to observe the most important Vietnamese holiday, which is the first day of the year on their lunar calendar known as Tet. North Vietnamese troops broke the cease-fire and attacked South Vietnam early in the morning on January 31, surprising the United States and South Vietnamese armies. This became known as the Tet Offensive. This lasted for a month and thousands of United States soldiers were killed or injured. It was after the Tet Offensive that success in Vietnam seemed impossible and public opinion changed. Referring back to Figure 1, the same graph by Gartner, Segura, and Wilkening shows that in March of 1968, public approval of the administration's handling of the war reached its lowest point at 29.8%.³⁴¹

TABLE 1
Distribution of Approval and Disapproval of
the Administration's Handling of the Vietnam War

<i>Poll</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Percentage Approval</i>	<i>Total</i>
1	October 1965	78.1	1,159
2	August 1966	67.0	973
3	January 1967	58.6	860
4	November 1967	53.1	968
5	March 1968	29.8	994
6	May 1970	53.4	466
7	April 1971	49.0	929
8	October 1971	46.6	895
9	April 1972	46.0	494
Total		—	7,738

Figure 1. Gartner, Scott S. Segura, Gary M. Wilkening, Michael. "All Politics are Local: Local Losses and Individual Attitudes toward the Vietnam War." *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41: 5 (October 1997): 669-694.



Figure 2. Okamoto, Yoichi R. Photo. Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, July 23, 1966. ARC identifier: 192607. Retrieved: 4/21/10.

Looking At the Media

It is heavily debated that the media had an influence on the decline in public support for the war, especially after the Tet Offensive. There are various media factors that may have influenced public opinion such as television coverage, newspapers, and music. During the Vietnam War, television played a crucial role in relaying information directly from the battlefields and into the living rooms of American citizens. The Vietnam War is known as the “television war” or the “living room war” because it was the first war to be televised. This had an impact on how people conceptualized war because they made the transition from only reading about the wars in newspapers to seeing actual footage from the battle fields broadcasted in their own homes. For the first time, American civilians were able to see the true horrors of war.³⁴²

One of the issues that arose was the censorship laws, or lack of them. Censorship was not instituted during the Vietnam War; it was the first war in which journalists were allowed to routinely accompany military forces and were not subject to censorship. Journalists had to agree to a set of rules that prohibited things such as reporting troop movements or casualty figures until they were announced in Saigon, but for the most part journalists were allowed to go where they wanted and report what they wanted.³⁴³

Reporting Vietnam

When it came to television coverage of Vietnam, some Americans claimed that the press showed too much of the bloody horrors of war, while others claimed that the reporters showed too little because they never ventured into the battlefields. In Daniel Hallin’s book *“The Uncensored War”: The Media and Vietnam*, he discusses that neither of these views are true. Many reporters did feel that the only way to report Vietnam was

to report from the battlefields and focus on the Americans in action. However, only about twenty-two percent of all of the film reports from Southeast Asia before the Tet Offensive showed actual combat. More often than not, it was minimal combat with gunshots in the background or a distant film of air strikes. In addition, Hallin describes that twenty-four percent of film reports showed dead or wounded soldiers, which would be no more than a brief shot of a soldier being lifted into a helicopter. One of the reasons that there was such little military action broadcasted on television was because of network policies. They could not show identifiable American casualties before the families were notified. In addition, the networks were hesitant about broadcasting graphic coverage with a concern that it would have offended the families of those who were killed in combat.³⁴⁴

Similar to Hallin, Andrew Huebner discusses the varying beliefs on news coverage of the Vietnam War in his article “Rethinking American Press coverage of the Vietnam War, 1965-68.” However, Huebner focuses more on how the news networks did not romanticize war at all. Huebner particularly discusses the impact of the press coverage on the administration. For example, in 1965, CBS released footage of American soldiers burning thatched huts after an order to destroy the village. This came right after President Johnson’s decision to boost his administration’s military commitment in South Vietnam. President Johnson and military leaders were furious about this, and in a telephone conversation between Johnson and CBS president Frank Stanton, Johnson asked Stanton, “Are you trying to fuck me?” President Johnson started to believe that the news organizations were opposed to him and purposely delivered biased coverage to make the viewers opposed to the war as well.³⁴⁵

In the late 1960s, American soldiers were seen looking hungry, tired, demoralized, and wounded. In 1967, CBS reporter John Laurence was sent to Vietnam and told the soldiers he wanted to take pictures of them winning the war so the people back home could see how well they were doing. However, Laurence found that the war was different from what he expected. He found American soldiers who were tired, lonely, hungry, thirsty, and, overall, depressed. Huebner states, the American soldiers “seemed skeptical of their superiors and official accounts of the fighting often contradicted impressions given by interviews with individual G.I.s”.³⁴⁶

Oppositional Stance?

Some argue that after the Tet Offensive in 1968 the media took an obvious oppositional stance towards the war. Although many argue that the press coverage did take an oppositional stance, others state that it did not. In the article “The Media, the War in Vietnam, and Political Support: A Critique of the Thesis of an Oppositional Media,” Daniel Hallin argues how the media did not take an oppositional stance. Hallin conducts a study to determine if the media took an oppositional stance towards the war using a random sample of 779 television broadcasts from August 20, 1965 and January 27, 1973. He discovers that although there was an increase in critical stories about the Vietnam War after the Tet Offensive, there was not a sign of an oppositional stance taken by journalists. Throughout this article, Hallin discusses how at first it did seem that the media took an oppositional stance toward the administration; however, he explains that when he did further research he found that there was no change in political views despite the more critical coverage of the war.³⁴⁷

Hallin presents various statistics to aid in his critique. The one graph shows the direction of television journalists' editorial comments on major actors of the Vietnam War. For the administration and its supporters before the Tet Offensive, 78.6% of the comments were favorable, while 21.4% of the comments were unfavorable. During the Tet Offensive 100% of the editorial comments were unfavorable towards the administration, and after the Tet Offensive, 28.8% were favorable, while 71.3% were unfavorable. Another graph shows the positive and negative references made to democracy in South Vietnam. Before the Tet Offensive, there were 4.5 positive references and 6.0 negative references. After the Tet Offensive, there were 3.5 positive references and 37.0 negative references. Another graph shows the positive and negative references made to the morale of U.S troops. Before the Tet Offensive, there were 4.0 positive references with no negative references; however, after the Tet Offensive there were 2.5 positive references and 14.5 negative references. From the data, one may conclude that the media did in fact take an oppositional stance. Yet, Hallin digs further into the debate and concludes that the shift in critical stories did not have to do with the media taking an oppositional stance towards the war, but rather it reflected the failure of U.S intervention and policy in Vietnam.³⁴⁸

Similar to Hallin's article, Frank D. Russo conducted a study to determine if television coverage of the Vietnam War was biased between 1969 and 1970 in his article "A Study of Bias in TV Coverage of the Vietnam War: 1969 and 1970." In this article, Russo tried to assess the bias of television coverage by examining newscasts shown on NBC and CBS in 1969 and 1970. Russo uses forty-eight newscasts from CBS and forty-eight newscasts from NBC. There were two newscasts used from each month over the

two-year period without using any two newscasts that were within seven days of each other. Russo had five Yale students who had ranging political beliefs to view the news coverage and to rate it as poor, fair, or unfair, and as pro-administration or anti-administration. Russo's study confirms Hallin's conclusion by reviewing the results of his study and stated that there was no bias towards the administration through news coverage during the Vietnam War. On the other hand, it would be difficult to imagine a world without media influence.³⁴⁹

Although it may be proven that the media itself did not take an oppositional stance toward the Vietnam War, that does not mean that the increasingly critical coverage of the war, and the horrific footage displayed on the television screens in American homes, did not have some sort of an affect on public opinion. The video recording, "Vietnam: Chronicle of a War," was broadcasted on CBS in 1984. Narrated by leading CBS evening news anchor Walter Cronkite, it traced the history of the Vietnam War using actual newscasts throughout the 1960s and 1970s. The horrific footage that was shown in this video was what was being projected into the living rooms of millions of Americans during the Vietnam War. Various newscasts showed American soldiers being shot at and lying on the ground wounded before they were picked up and taken for medical help. In one CBS newscast, Ike Papis reported from deep in the Delta where soldiers had stumbled upon evidence of how the Vietcong treated the prisoners. He reported that the South Vietnamese prisoners were massacred and left to die, and showed footage of the bones that were the only remains.³⁵⁰

The newscasts also showed the innocent civilians who were affected by the War. Footage of American soldiers burning villages was aired on televisions across America.

In addition, pictures of wounded civilians without legs and other injuries allowed Americans at home to question the reasons for American involvement in Vietnam. If the purpose for American involvement in Vietnam was to restore democracy and help the South Vietnamese, why were so many innocent South Vietnamese civilians being killed or injured?³⁵¹

Walter Cronkite was considered by many to be the “most trusted man in America,” and he covered the Vietnam War from start to finish. He spent some time reporting in Vietnam, and when he returned after the Tet Offensive, he stated, “To say that we are mired in stalemate seems the only realistic, yet unsatisfactory conclusion.” It was after this statement that Johnson responded, “If I have lost Cronkite, I have lost America,” and soon after announced that he would not run for re-election. Although studies show that television did not take an oppositional stance towards the Vietnam War, when the “most trusted man in America” stated that he did not believe that the United States would be successful in Vietnam, public opinion was swayed.³⁵²

Bias in Print

In addition to television, newspapers played an important role in relaying information about the War to Americans at home. However, on the contrary to television, newspapers did have a bias. In Stephen N. Elias’ article “American Newspaper Editorials and the Vietnam War: An Experimental Approach to Editorial Content Analysis,” he conducts a study that examined 131 editorials that appeared in the *New York Times*, the *Washington Post*, the *Chicago Tribune*, the *Los Angeles Times*, and the *Wall Street Journal* within twenty-one days following four major events of the War in order to understand the content, tone, and page placement of the articles. The events

were the Gulf of Tonkin incident, the 1968 Tet Offensive, President Nixon's "Vietnamization" announcement, and the fall of Saigon.³⁵³

Elias concluded that the general tone of all of the newspapers was anti-war. Specifically, the *New York Times* was anti-war throughout the period studied while the *Wall Street Journal* trended from anti-war to pro-war. He found that the *Chicago Tribune*, the *Washington Post*, and the *Los Angeles Times* trended from pro-war to anti-war. The findings from Elias' study confirm that there were media sources that did show their bias towards the Vietnam War. Therefore, the paper that one chose to read would project a certain bias, in turn impacting public opinion.³⁵⁴

Impact of Reporting Casualties

One thing that may have had a stronger impact in newspapers than on television was casualty reports. Newspapers reporting the number of casualties would often times report for the total Americans lost, and the total number of local casualties. As the Vietnam War continued, the total number of casualties increased dramatically for all involved in the war. Americans were able to see these numbers increase right in front of their own eyes in their newspapers. In the article "All Politics are Local: Local Losses and Individual Attitudes toward the Vietnam War," Scott S. Gartner, Gary M. Segura, and Michael Wilkening looked at the number of local level casualties and national level casualties to determine if they had an impact on public opinion. The authors concluded that there was a positive relationship between casualties and anti-war sentiments, especially when there were a high number of local losses.³⁵⁵

Gartner, Segura, and Wilkening supported their findings with a graph shown in Figure 1 that represents individual attitudes toward the administration's handling of the

war, which was mentioned earlier. As the number of casualties peaked around the Tet Offensive, public support of the administration reached its lowest point. The graph shows public support gradually increasing between 1970 and 1972, but stays within 46% and 53%. They determine that one of the reasons public support slightly increased was because the number of casualties gradually declined. They stated that using casualty levels in the beginning of the war was effective in determining the effects on public opinion; however, it is difficult to determine the reasons for the Americans' opinions on the administration in the latter half of the war because the number of casualties slightly declined. The authors conclude that the reason public opinion never reached over 53% was because of individual level variables. The findings of Gartner, Segura, and Wilkening clearly show that the way the media reported information had an influence on public opinion.³⁵⁶

The Baltimore Sun frequently published stories on local casualties. From January to April in 1967, there were five articles published on the deaths of Maryland soldiers in Vietnam. In addition, there were many stories that dealt with protests both in the United States and over seas. On March 26, 1967, an article described a march in London with a 2,000-person chain that linked the United States and South Vietnam embassies. Similar articles followed which included more coverage on protests and reports of increasing casualties in 1967. That same year, it seemed that the coverage of the war got increasingly more critical with almost every story dealing with a protest from citizens, politicians, and even foreigners. Other articles dealt with local casualties. Post 1967, the articles were still critical, but there was also much coverage on the administration and elections.³⁵⁷

No Faith in Nixon

In an article on October 15, 1970, *The Baltimore Sun* reported Gallup Poll results, which stated that 55% of Americans had more faith in Democrats when it came to dealing with the three of the five top major issues. The three top issues were the Vietnam War, campus violence, and civil rights. President Nixon was a member of the Republican Party and this shows that the American public did not have faith in his administration for ending the Vietnam War. The indications from this poll may be partly a result from a speech that President Nixon made on November 3, 1969. In this address to the nation, he began by discussing the situation he was faced with when he was inaugurated in January. He discussed the number of Americans killed in action, the South Vietnamese training plan that was far behind, the 540,000 Americans in Vietnam and no plans to reduce the number, and the fact that the war was causing deep divisions at home. He further stated that despite those who had urged him to withdraw troops immediately, he would not do that because it would not lead to peace. Moreover, he tried to persuade the American citizens of the dangers of immediate withdrawal and the benefits of a continuation in the Vietnamization plan.³⁵⁸

Influence of Music

Another form of media that could have influenced public opinion was music. Some who opposed the war chose to express their feelings through music. Country Joe and the Fish was a band in the 1960s that was famous for the anti-Vietnam War songs. In their one song, "*The Fish Cheer and I Feel-Like-I'm-Fixin'-To-Die-Rag*," they sang:

"One, two, three, what are we fighting for? Don't ask me, I don't give a damn, Next stop is Vietnam; And it's five, six, seven, open up the pearly gates, well their ain't no time to wonder why, Whoopee! We're all gonna die."

This was just one song off their album “I-Feel-Like-I’m Fixin’-To-Die-Rag,” but some of the other songs from the album carried the same anti-war sentiment. There were also many other anti-war songs from other artists that were popular during the Vietnam War era. In August of 1969, the famous concert Woodstock took place the weekend of Friday the 15th. The poster advertising the music festival stated “3 days of Peace and Music.” Country Joe and the Fish performed at the festival along with other musicians who sang their anti-war music.³⁵⁹

Anti-War Demonstrations

As discovered, the public opinion of the war decreased throughout the 1960s, so how did people handle their strong opposition towards the war? Many opponents of the war tried to influence the administrative decisions using various tactics such as petitions, demonstrations, and sending mail to the White House. The Vietnam War is famous for its protests, and some of these protests were being executed right from the beginning of the War. At first, the protests were mainly non-violent such as teach-ins and petitioning, but after a while, the protests became violent and many were jailed or killed.

Some of the non-violent protests included teach-ins and petitioning. Teach-ins are discussions on a particular issue to raise awareness or express a position on a social or political issue; during the war, they were mainly held on College campuses. Towson University held a number of teach-ins according to their school newspaper *The Towerlight*. However, as with the rest of the citizens of America, the Towson University students did not always have an opposition towards the War. On January 14, 1966 there was a debate sponsored by the International Relations Club on the United States involvement in the Vietnam War. Of those in attendance, the majority of the audience

avored increased involvement. However, those attitudes began to change throughout articles in late 1966 and 1967. It was announced in the February 17, 1967 newspaper that a Vietnam Teach-In was planned for Monday March 6 to discuss the problem of war on society, and to stress the political, economic, and social repercussions of the war.³⁶⁰

The following *Towerlight* editions featured numerous stories on the Vietnam War to keep students informed. Faculty and students were involved in anti-war protests in Washington D.C. In an article on October 27, 1967, there was an interview with Professor Philip Marcus who was a professor of physical science and was arrested during a sit-in at the Pentagon. There were numerous Towson representatives at the sit-in including students and other faculty members. Furthermore, following the Tet Offensive there was an increase in critical stories about the Vietnam War in *The Towerlight*. On May 11, 1970, there was a student protest on campus in remembrance of the Kent State Massacre that occurred a couple days earlier. Faculty and students spoke their opposition to the war to over 500 students who were gathered outside an academic building.³⁶¹

However, Towson University was not the only campus protesting the war in Vietnam. From the University of Michigan to the University of California at Berkley, many College campuses across the United States were holding teach-ins, sit-ins and other forms of non-violent demonstrations. Though after a while, these demonstrations started to take new form. Students would start to burn their draft cards in protest of the Vietnam War and on May 4, 1970 at Kent State University in Ohio, four students were shot dead by the Ohio National Guard for protesting the Vietnam War.³⁶²

Looking at photographs from the Lyndon B. Johnson Library and Museum, one can see how many people were involved in the anti-war movement. There are numerous



Figure 3. Wolfe, Frank. Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, October 21, 1967. ARC identifier: 192605. Retrieved: 4/21/10.




Figure 4. Wolfe, Frank. Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, October 21, 1967. ARC identifier: 192603. Retrieved: 4/21/10.

pictures from the March on Washington in 1967 that show how many people were there protesting the war. As shown in Figures 3 and 4, protestors held up signs that said “Get the hell out of Vietnam” and catchier phrases like “I don’t give a damn about Uncle Sam, I ain’t goin’ to Vietnam.”³⁶³

Despite all of the protests and those involved, the article by E.M Schreiber, “Anti-War Demonstrations and American Public Opinion on the War in Vietnam,” investigates whether or not anti-war demonstrations had an impact on public opinion. Using three Gallup Polls from one month to five years after demonstrations with 10,000 or more participants, Schreiber concluded that there is no evidence that shows that anti-war demonstrations had an impact on public opinion. He further suggested that the changes in public opinion were influenced by the media’s views.³⁶⁴

The discussion of protests leads to another question: How did the protest movements impact the War? The goal behind the protests was to influence administrative policies and decisions and ultimately end the war. As discussed, those who opposed the war went to great lengths to have their voices heard. But some who opposed the war attacked directly through sending petitions or letters to the White House administrators, or meeting with government officials.

In the article “Influencing the Decision Makers: The Vietnam Experience,” author Melvin Small attempts to find out how the protests affected the Johnson and Nixon administrations decisions on what to do about the war. He used primary sources from Lyndon B. Johnson’s Presidential Library, secondary books and articles, and interviews with people who were involved during this time period to help answer his

question. Small investigated the main forms of protest that were used during this time and concluded that the Johnson and Nixon administrations were somewhat swayed by the anti-war demonstrations. He further explained that it was the larger anti-war demonstrations that had a bigger impact such as the March on Washington, the March on the Pentagon, and the Kent State Massacre. Moreover, Small stated that one of the most effective tactics used by those in opposition to the war was writing letters.³⁶⁵

In 1967, students of the New York Union Theological Seminary wrote a letter to Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara. In this letter, the students describe how they were exempt from the draft due to their classification in Selective Service. They go on to speak on behalf of those Americans who were being drafted but were in opposition to the war. The students propose that the Selective Service law be amended to include those who were conscientious objectors to a war. What prompted these students to write this letter was the fact that many law-abiding citizens were seeking out help from them. These young Americans were avoiding the draft because they did not believe in the war and because of that, they had to face legal consequences. They asked McNamara to respond to them with any thoughts or other options for those troubled Americans. This letter was not only signed by the students who wrote it, but by religious leaders, and over a thousand seminarians.³⁶⁶

The Media's Impact on the War

Now that we have explored the media and public opinion, we will explore the media's impact on the war itself. In the book *Public Affairs: The Military and the Media, 1962-68*, William Hammond explained the issues that can confront a society during war. He also described how the limited press censorship during the Vietnam War led to the

military blaming the press for the criticism they received and for turning the public against the war. Hammond described how the press would report on things that would upset the American public and make the military look bad. For example, in September 1965 a member from the Associated Press reported that the men of the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division were going into battle with “gaping holes” in their boots and wearing tennis shoes because they were in short supply of footwear. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs replied by saying the whole affair was exaggerated.³⁶⁷

Hammond discussed another instance that undermined the military. Jack Laurence of CBS news reported on civilians sifting through piles of garbage at a U.S Marine garbage dump. The footage showed these peasants looking through the garbage and Laurence reported that this was dangerous because live ammunition was mixed in with the garbage. It was only moments later that a grenade went off and wounded a little boy. It was events like this that made the military blame the press for turning the public against the war.³⁶⁸

Similarly, in the article “Vietnam: The Television War,” Michael Mandelbaum seeks to answer the question: did the United States lose the war because it was televised? Mandelbaum discussed how the media impacted the anti-war protests and consequently, how the anti-war protests impacted the war itself. He stated that television had an indirect influence over the anti-war movement’s development. He further stated that although television did not create active opposition to the war, it served as an outlet for the expression of the public’s opposition.³⁶⁹

Those who opposed the war knew that their views could reach people quicker using television and they used it to try to persuade the rest of the American public that the war should be stopped. The opponents of the war counted on being newsworthy because they could not afford to purchase time to broadcast directly. Demonstrations involved many people and occasionally would lead to conflict with the police. Consequently, coverage of anti-war demonstrations made good television. However, Mandelbaum concluded that the media was not the reason why the United States lost Vietnam. He stated that it was because the American public was not willing to pay the cost of winning, or avoid losing.³⁷⁰

Conclusion

The question that all of this brings us to is how did the Vietnam War effect our culture? The lack of censorship laws and the question that the media may have been the reason why the United States was unsuccessful in Vietnam could be one of the reasons why we have stricter censorship laws today. The Vietnam War allowed us to see what war was really like: the complete non-romanticized side of war for the first time. While some argue that the media shaped the culture to take an oppositional stance towards the war, others argue that the media had no role in shaping the culture. On the other hand, the culture of the era could have shaped the media with anti-war music and the introduction of stricter censorship laws.

The media played a pivotal role in impacting American society during the Vietnam War. As the first televised war, Americans saw the true horrors of war broadcasted right in their living room. Prominent newspapers also played a large role in transmitting influences during the war. Music and protests reflected the negative feelings

towards the war, and the public opinion polls are proof that public opinion dramatically decreased throughout the war. There are conflicting results from studies that seek to determine whether or not the media had an influence on public opinion, but can one imagine a society where the media did not play a role in shaping public opinion?

Endnotes

- ¹ Steven Cohen, *Vietnam: Anthology and Guide to a Television History* (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1983): 57-64.
- ² Ibid, 89.
- ³ Ibid, 90.
- ⁴ Ibid.
- ⁵ Scott S. Gartner, Gary M. Segura, Michael Wilkening, "All Politics are Local: Local Loses and Individual Attitudes toward the Vietnam War." *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41:5 (October 1997): 669-94; Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, photo by Yoichi R. Okamoto. July 23, 1966. ARC identifier: 192607. Retrieved: 4/21/10.
- ⁶ Gartner, Segura, Wilkening, 669-94.
- ⁷ Daniel C. Hallin, *"The Uncensored War": The Media and Vietnam* (Berkley: California University of California Press, 1989): 114-15.
- ⁸ Ibid, 128-29.
- ⁹ Ibid, 129-30.
- ¹⁰ Andrew Huebner, "Rethinking American Press Coverage of the Vietnam War, 1965-68," *Journalism History* 31: 3 (Fall 2005): 154.
- ¹¹ Ibid, 158-68.
- ¹² Daniel C. Hallin, "The Media, the War in Vietnam, and Political Support: A Critique of the Thesis of an Oppositional Media," *The Journal of Politics* 46: 1 (February 1984): 5.
- ¹³ Ibid, 8-10.
- ¹⁴ Ibid; Frank D. Russo, "A Study of Bias in TV Coverage of the Vietnam War: 1969 and 1970," *The Public Opinion Quarterly* 35: 4 (Winter 1971-1972): 539-41.
- ¹⁵ Ibid, 542; Walter Cronkite, *Vietnam: Chronicles of a War*, VHS, CBS Fox Video, Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc (Farmington Hills, MI: 1984).
- ¹⁶ Ibid.
- ¹⁷ Hallin, *The Uncensored War*, 170.
- ¹⁸ Stephen N. Elias, "American Newspaper Editorials on the Vietnam War: An Experimental Approach to Editorial Content Analysis," *Theory and Methodology* (August 1978): 1-4.
- ¹⁹ Ibid, 8-10.
- ²⁰ Gartner, Segura, Wilkening, 669-92.
- ²¹ Ibid, 678-92.
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- ²⁴ Murray Polner, Thomas E. Woods Jr., *We Who Dared To Say No To War: American Anti-War Writing From 1812 to Now* (Philadelphia: Basic Books, 2008): 255-58.
- ²⁵ Timothy R. Buttner, "Vietnam Question Debated," *The Towerlight*, January 14, 1966; Christian B. Wilson, "Vietnam Teach-In Planned To Survey Asian Conflict," *The Towerlight*, February 17, 1967.
- ²⁶ Towerlight Representative, "TSC Prof Busted At Sit-In," *The Towerlight*, October 27, 1967; Donna Quante, "All We Are Saying Is... Give Peace A Chance!," *The Towerlight*, May 11, 1970.
- ²⁷ John Dumbrell, *Vietnam and the Antiwar Movement*, (Brookfield, Vermont: Avebury, 1989), 43-68.
- ²⁸ Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, photo by Frank Wolfe. October 21, 1967. ARC identifier: 192603. Retrieved: 4/21/10; Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, photo by Frank Wolfe. October 21, 1967. ARC identifier: 192605. Retrieved: 4/21/10.
- ²⁹ E.M Schreiber, "Anti-War Demonstrations and American Public Opinion on the War in Vietnam," *The British Journal of Sociology* 27 : 2 (June 1976): 225-31.
- ³⁰ Melvin Small, "Influencing the Decision Makers: The Vietnam Experience," *Journal of Peace Research* 24 : 2 (June 1987): 185-93.

³¹ Polner, Woods Jr., 240-42.

³² William M. Hammond, *Public Affairs: The Military and the Media, 1962-1968*, (Washington D.C Center of Military History, 1988; 197-226.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Michael Mandelbaum, "Vietnam: The Television War," *Daedalus* 111 : 4 (Fall, 1982): 160-64.

³⁵ Ibid, 164-67.

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